The Campaign of Chancellorsville

The Campaign of
Chancellorsville

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Title: The Campaign of Chancellorsville
Author: Theodore A. Dodge
Release Date: May, 2004 [EBook #5715] [Yes, we are more than one

year ahead of schedule] [This file was first posted on August 14, 2002]
Edition: 10
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, THE
CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE ***

This etext was produced by Ken Reeder

Errata and other transcription notes are included as an appendix
As companion to this etext, I recommend maps available on the
Internet from the History Department of the U. S. Military Academy:
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/ACivilWarPages/AC
WToC.htm

THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE
by Theodore A. Dodge

To the members of The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts,
of whose researches into the history of our Civil War the following
pages form but a modest part, this volume is, with Sincere Regard,
Dedicated by the author.

CONTENTS.
I. INTRODUCTION II. CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS III.
HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IV. THE ARMY
OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA V. DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK VI.
THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT
WING VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING IX. LEE'S
INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS X. HOOKER'S ADVANCE
FRIDAY XI. POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE XII.

JACKSON'S MARCH AND SICKLES'S ADVANCE XIII.
HOOKER'S THEORIES AND CHANCES XIV. POSITION OF THE
ELEVENTH CORPS XV. SITUATION AT SIX O'CLOCK XVI.
JACKSON'S ATTACK XVII. CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH
CORPS XVIII. HOOKER'S PARRY XIX. THE MIDNIGHT
ATTACK XX. STONEWALL JACKSON XXI. POSTION AT
FAIRVIEW XXII. THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW XXIII. THE LEFT
CENTRE XXIV. THE NEW LINES XXV. SUNDAY'S
MISCARRIAGE XXVI. SEDGWICK'S CHANGE OF ORDERS
XXVII. SEDGWICK'S ASSAULT XXVIII. SEDGWICK MARCHES
TOWARD HOOKER XXIX. SALEM CHURCH XXX. SEDGWICK
IN DIFFICULTY XXXI. SEDGWICK WITHDRAWS XXXII.
HOOKER'S CRITICISMS XXXIII. HOOKER'S FURTHER PLANS
XXXIV. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES XXXV.
OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS XXXVI. HOOKER'S
RESUME XXXVII. SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE
APPENDIX.

THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.
I.
INTRODUCTION.
It must seem to the casual reader of the history of the war of 1861-65,
that enough has already been written upon the campaign of
Chancellorsville. And there are numerous brilliant essays, in the
histories now before the public, which give a coup-d'oeil more or less
accurate of this ten-days' passage of arms. But none of these spread
before the reader facts sufficiently detailed to illustrate the particular
theory advanced by each to account for the defeat of the Army of the
Potomac on this field.
The stigma besmirching the character of the Eleventh Corps, and of
Howard, its then commanding general, for a panic and rout in but a
small degree owing to them; the unjust strictures passed upon
Sedgwick for his failure to execute a practically impossible order; the
truly remarkable blunders into which Gen. Hooker allowed himself to
lapse, in endeavoring to explain away his responsibility for the disaster;
the bare fact, indeed, that the Army of the Potomac was here beaten by
Lee, with one-half its force; and the very partial publication, thus far, of

the details of the campaign, and the causes of our defeat,--may stand as
excuse for one more attempt to make plain its operations to the
survivors of the one hundred and eighty thousand men who there bore
arms, and to the few who harbor some interest in the subject as mere
history.
To say that Gen. Hooker lapsed into blunders in explaining his share in
this defeat, is to use a form of words purposely tempered to the
memory of a gallant soldier, who, whatever his shortcomings, has done
his country signal service; and to avoid the imputation of baldly
throwing down the gauntlet of ungracious criticism. All reference to
Gen. Hooker's skill or conduct in this, one of the best conceived and
most fatally mismanaged of the many unsuccessful advances of the
Army of the Potomac,