The Bay State Monthly, Volume 3, No. 4 | Page 9

fight. It is but fair to say that the tone of a portion of the
Northern press, and the speeches of some of the Northern Democrats,
and the ambiguous way of speaking on the part of some of the Northern
Republicans rather warranted than discouraged such an opinion.
There was, however, one prominent man from Massachusetts, who had
united with the Southern leaders in the support of Breckenridge, who
had wisdom as well as wit, and who now sought to dispel this false idea.
In the month of December he was in Washington, and he asked his old
associates what it meant.
"It means," said they, "separation, and a Southern Confederacy. We
will have our independence, and establish a Southern government, with
no discordant elements."
"Are you prepared for war?" inquired Butler.

"Oh! there will be no war; the North will not fight."
"The North will fight. The North will send the last man and expend the
last dollar to maintain the government."
"But," said his Southern friends, "the North can't fight; we have too
many allies there."
"You have friends," said Butler, "in the North, who will stand by you
so long as you fight your battles in the Union; but the moment you fire
on the flag the Northern people will be a unit against you. And you
may be assured, if war comes, slavery ends."
Butler was far too sagacious a man not to perceive that war was
inevitable, and too sturdy and patriotic not to resist it. With a boldness
and frankness which have shown themselves through his whole
political career, he went to Buchanan; he advised and begged him to
arrest the commissioners, with whom he was then parleying, and to
have them tried for treason! Such advice it was as characteristic of
Benjamin F. Butler to give as it was of President Buchanan to
disregard.
II.
But the adoption of secession ordinances and the assumption of
independent authority was not enough for the Cotton Republic. Though
they hoped to evade civil war, still they never forgot for a moment that
a conflict was not only possible, but even probable. Their prudence told
them that they ought to prepare for such an emergency by at once
taking possession of all the arms and military forts within their borders.
At this time there was a large navy-yard at Pensacola, Florida; from
twelve to fifteen harbor forts along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts;
half-a-dozen arsenals, stocked with an aggregate of one hundred and
fifty thousand arms (transferred there about a year before from
Northern arsenals, by Secretary Floyd); three mints; four important
custom-houses; three revenue cutters, on duty at leading Southern
seaports, and a vast amount of valuable miscellaneous property,--all of

which had been purchased with the money of the Federal Government.
The land on which the navy-yards, arsenals, forts, and, indeed, all the
buildings so purchased and controlled, stood, was vested in the United
States, not alone by the right of eminent domain, but also by formal
legislative deeds of cession from the States themselves, _wherein they_
were located. The self-constituted governments of these State now
assumed either that the right of eminent domain reverted to them, or
that it had always belonged to them; and that they were perfectly
justified in taking absolute possession, "holding themselves responsible
in money damages to be settled by negotiation." The Federal
Government and the sentiment of the North regarded this hypothesis
false and absurd.
In due season the governors of the Cotton States, by official orders to
their extemporized militia companies, took forcible possession of all
the property belonging to the Federal Government lying within the
borders of these States. This proceeding was no other than _levying
actual war against the United States_. There was as yet no bloodshed,
however, and for this reason: the regular army of the United States
amounted then to but little over seventeen thousand men, and, most of
these being on the Western frontier, there was only a small garrison at
each of the Southern forts; all that was necessary, therefore, was for a
superior armed force--as a rule, State militia--to demand the surrender
of these forts in the name of the State, and it would at once, though
under protest, be complied with. There were three notable exceptions to
this peaceable evacuation,--first, no attempt was made against Fort
Taylor, at Key West; Fort Jefferson, on Tortugas Island; and Fort
Pickens, at Pensacola, on account of the distance and danger; second,
part of the troops in Texas were eventually refused the promised transit,
and were captured; third, the forts in Charleston harbor underwent
peculiar vicissitudes, which will be recounted later on.
The conspiracy which, for a while at least, seemed destined to
overcome all obstacles, was not confined to South Carolina or the
Cotton States. Unfortunately