The Barbarism of Berlin | Page 2

doubt about the villain of the story.
These are the last facts; the facts which involved England. It is equally
easy to state the first facts; the facts which involved Europe. The prince
who practically ruled Austria was shot by certain persons whom the
Austrian Government believed to be conspirators from Servia. The
Austrian Government piled up arms and armies, but said not a word
either to Servia their suspect, or Italy their ally. From the documents it
would seem that Austria kept everybody in the dark, except Prussia. It
is probably nearer the truth to say that Prussia kept everybody in the
dark, including Austria. But all that is what is called opinion, belief,
conviction, or common sense: and we are not dealing with it here. The
objective fact is that Austria told Servia to permit Servian officers to be
suspended by the authority of Austrian officers; and told Servia to
submit to this within forty-eight hours. In other words, the Sovereign of
Servia was practically told to take off not only the laurels of two great
campaigns, but his own lawful and national crown, and to do it in a
time in which no respectable citizen is expected to discharge an hotel

bill. Servia asked for time for arbitration--in short, for peace. But
Russia had already begun to mobilise; and Prussia, presuming that
Servia might thus be rescued, declared war.
Between these two ends of fact, the ultimatum to Servia, the ultimatum
to Belgium, anyone so inclined can of course talk as if everything were
relative. If anyone asks why the Czar should rush to the support of
Servia, it is easy to ask why the Kaiser should rush to the support of
Austria. If anyone says that the French would attack the Germans, it is
sufficient to answer that the Germans did attack the French. There
remain, however, two attitudes to consider, even perhaps two
arguments to counter, which can best be considered and countered
under this general head of facts. First of all, there is a curious, cloudy
sort of argument, much affected by the professional rhetoricians of
Prussia, who are sent out to instruct and correct the minds of
Americans or Scandinavians. It consists of going into convulsions of
incredulity and scorn at the mention of Russia's responsibility of Servia,
or England's responsibility of Belgium; and suggesting that, treaty or
no treaty, frontier or no frontier, Russia would be out to slay Teutons or
England to steal Colonies. Here, as elsewhere, I think the professors
dotted all over the Baltic plain fail in lucidity and in the power of
distinguishing ideas. Of course it is quite true that England has material
interests to defend, and will probably use the opportunity to defend
them; or, in other words, of course England, like everybody else, would
be more comfortable if Prussia were less predominant.
The fact remains that we did not do what the Germans did. We did not
invade Holland to seize a naval and commercial advantage; and
whether they say that we wished to do it in our greed, or feared to do it
in our cowardice, the fact remains that we did not do it. Unless this
commonsense principle be kept in view, I cannot conceive how any
quarrel can possibly be judged. A contract may be made between two
persons solely for material advantage on each side: but the moral
advantage is still generally supposed to lie with the person who keeps
the contract. Surely it cannot be dishonest to be honest--even if honesty
is the best policy. Imagine the most complex maze of indirect motive;
and still the man who keeps faith for money cannot possibly be worse
than the man who breaks faith for money. It will be noted that this
ultimate test applies in the same way to Servia as to Belgium and

Britain. The Servians may not be a very peaceful people, but on the
occasion under discussion it was certainly they who wanted peace. You
may choose to think the Serb a sort of born robber: but on this occasion
it was certainly the Austrian who was trying to rob. Similarly, you may
call England perfidious as a sort of historical summary; and declare
your private belief that Mr. Asquith was vowed from infancy to the
ruin of the German Empire, a Hannibal and hater of the eagles. But,
when all is said, it is nonsense to call a man perfidious because he
keeps his promise. It is absurd to complain of the sudden treachery of a
business man in turning up punctually to his appointment: or the unfair
shock given to a creditor by the debtor paying his debts.
Lastly, there is an attitude, not unknown in the crisis, against which I
should particularly like to protest. I should