Ten Years Exile | Page 9

Anne Louise Germaine Necker Baronne de Stael-Holstein
(who was in other respects a most interesting
character,) comprehend that the happiness of France required that her
army should then meet with reverses, and I received the supposed good

news which he sent me, with a degree of restraint which was very little
in unison with my character. Was it necessary since that to be
continually hearing of the triumphs of him who made his successes fall
indiscriminately upon the heads of all? and out of so many victories,
has there ever arisen a single gleam of happiness for poor France?
The battle of Marengo was lost for a couple of hours: the negligence of
General Melas, who trusted too much to the advantages he had gained,
and the audacity of General Desaix, restored the victory to the French
arms. While the fate of the battle was almost desperate, Bonaparte rode
about slowly on horseback, pensive, and looking downward, more
courageous against danger than misfortune, attempting nothing, but
waiting the turn of the wheel. He has behaved several times in a similar
way, and has found his advantage in it. But I cannot help always
thinking, that if Bonaparte had fairly encountered among his
adversaries a man of character and probity, he would have been
stopped short in his career. His great talent lies in terrifying the feeble,
and availing himself of unprincipled characters. When he encounters
honour any where, it may be said that his artifices are disconcerted, as
evil spirits are conjured by the sign of the cross.
The armistice which was the result of the battle of Marengo, the
conditions of which included the cession of all the strong places in the
North of Italy, was most disadvantageous to Austria. Bonaparte could
not have gained more by a succession of victories. But it might be said
that the continental powers appeared to consider it honorable to give up
what would have been worth still more if they had allowed them to be
taken. They made haste to sanction the injustice of Napoleon, and to
legitimate his conquests, while they ought, if they could not conquer, at
least not to have seconded him. This certainly was not asking too much
of the old cabinets of Europe; but they knew not how to conduct
themselves in so novel a situation, and Bonaparte confounded them so
much by the union of promises and threats, that in giving up, they
believed they were gaining, and rejoiced at the word peace, as much as
if this word had preserved its old signification. The illuminations, the
reverences, the dinners, and firing of cannon to celebrate this peace,
were exactly the same as formerly: but far from cicatrizing the wounds,

it introduced into the government which signed it a most certain and
effectual principle of dissolution.
The most remarkable circumstance in the fortune of Napoleon is the
sovereigns whom he found upon the throne. Paul I. particularly did him
incalculable service; he had the same enthusiasm for him that his father
had felt for Frederic the Second, and he abandoned Austria at the
moment when she was still attempting to struggle. Bonaparte persuaded
him that the whole of Europe would be pacified for centuries, if the two
great empires of the East and West were agreed; and Paul, who had
something chivalrous in his disposition, allowed himself to be
entrapped by these fallacies. It was an extraordinary piece of good
fortune in Bonaparte to meet with a crowned head so easily duped, and
who united violence and weakness in such equal degrees: no one
therefore regretted Paul more than he did, for no one was it so
important to him to deceive.
Lucien, the minister of the interior, who was perfectly acquainted with
his brother's schemes, caused a pamphlet to be published, with the view
of preparing men's minds for the establishment of a new dynasty. This
publication was premature, and had a bad effect; Fouche availed
himself of it to ruin Lucien. He persuaded Bonaparte that the secret was
revealed too soon, and told the republican party, that Bonaparte
disavowed what his brother had done. In consequence Lucien was then
sent ambassador to Spain. The system of Bonaparte was to advance
gradually in the road to power; he was constantly spreading rumours of
the plans he had in agitation, in order to feel the public opinion.
Generally even he was anxious to have his projects exaggerated, in
order that the thing itself, when it took place, might be a softening of
the apprehension which had circulated in public. The vivacity of Lucien
on this occasion carried him too far, and Bonaparte judged it advisable
to sacrifice him to appearances for some time.


CHAPTER 5.

The infernal machine.--Peace of Luneville.
I returned to Paris in the month of November 1800. Peace was not yet
Continue reading on your phone by scaning this QR Code

 / 97
Tip: The current page has been bookmarked automatically. If you wish to continue reading later, just open the Dertz Homepage, and click on the 'continue reading' link at the bottom of the page.