Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909 | Page 5

both Houses standing for good legislation and opposing
bad, accomplished so little; how it was that a minority, at practically
every turn, defeated a majority.
There were three principal reasons for this outcome.
(1) The machine, as its name indicates, is a definite organization, with
recognized leaders. The anti-machine element was without organization
or recognized leaders.
(2) The reform-advocating majority, except in the anti-racetrack
gambling fight, was without definite plan of action. The majority was,
for example, for the passage of a direct primary law that would, first,
take the control of politics out of the hands of political bosses big and
little, and, second, give the people of California the privilege of naming
their United States Senators, a privilege already enjoyed by the people
of the more progressive States of the Union. But the reform element
knew little or nothing of the details of direct primary legislation.
They were equally unprepared on other reform issues. They recognized
the necessity of passing an effective railroad regulation law, for
example, but had little or no conception of what the provisions of the
measure should be. They recognized that the criminal laws cannot be
impartially enforced against rich and poor alike until the methods of
criminal procedure be simplified, put on a common sense basis. But
even here they had no definite policy and when told by machine
claquers that the proposed reforms were revolutionary, even the most

insistent of the reform element were content to let the simplifying
amendments to the codes die in committees or on the files.
On the other hand, the machine element, even before a member had
reached Sacramento, had their work for the session carefully outlined.
This session the bulk of the machine's work was negative; that is to say,
with a majority in both houses opposed to machine policies, the
machine recognized the difficulties of passing bad laws except by trick
- and spent the session in amending good measures into ineffectiveness,
or, where they could, in preventing their passage. Down to a comma the
machine leaders knew what they wanted for a direct primary law, for an
anti-racetrack gambling law, for a railroad regulation law. From the
hour the Legislature opened until the gavels fell at the moment of
adjournment the machine element labored intelligently and constantly,
and as an organized working unit, to carry its ends. There were no false
plays; no waste of time or energy; every move was calculated. By
persistent hammering the organized machine minority was able to wear
its unorganized opponents out.[2]
(3) The third reason for the failure of the reform majority is found in
the fact that the minority was permitted to organize both Senate and
Assembly. In the Assembly the machine element named the Speaker
without serious opposition. The Speaker named the Assembly
committees. It developed at the test that the important committees of
the Assembly were, generally speaking, controlled by the machine.
The Lieutenant-Governor is, under the State Constitution, presiding
officer of the Senate, under the title of President of the Senate. But the
Senators elect the President pro tem., who, in the absence of the
President, has the same power as the President. The reform element,
although in the majority, permitted the election of Senator Edward I.
Wolfe as President pro tem. Wolfe was admittedly leader of the
machine element in the Senate. At critical times during the session, the
fact that both the President and President pro tem. of the Senate were
friendly to machine interests gave the machine great advantage over its
anti-machine opponents.[3]
The reform majority in the Senate made the further mistake of leaving
the appointment of the Senate committees in the hands of
Lieutenant-Governor Warren Porter. Governor Porter flaunts his
machine affiliations; is evidently proud of his political connections;

indeed, in an address delivered before the students of the University of
California, Porter advised his hearers to be "performers" in politics
rather than "reformers." It was not at all surprising, then, that the Senate
committees were appointed, not in the interest of the reform element,
but of the machine. And yet, the reform element, being in the majority,
could have taken the appointment of the committees out of Porter's
hands. In the concluding chapter it will be shown there is ample
precedent for such a course. But the reform element let the opportunity
pass, and Warren Porter named the committees. Thus in both Senate
and Assembly the strategic committee positions were permitted to fall
into machine hands.
The importance of this on legislation can scarcely be over-estimated.
Under the system in vogue in California, the real work of a legislative
session is done in committee. When a bill is introduced in either House,
it is at once referred to a committee. Until the committee reports on the
measure no further action