Shop Management | Page 9

by lessening the
feeling of antagonism between the two.
This system is successful because it diminishes soldiering, and this
rests entirely upon the fact that since the workman only receives say
one-third of the increase in pay that he would get under corresponding
conditions on piece work, there is not the same temptation for the

employer to cut prices.
After this system has been in operation for a year or two, if no cuts in
prices have been made, the tendency of the men to soldier on that
portion of the work which is being done under the system is diminished,
although it does not entirely cease. On the other hand, the tendency of
the men to soldier on new work which is started, and on such portions
as are still done on day work, is even greater under the Towne-Halsey
plan than under piece work.
To illustrate: Workmen, like the rest of mankind, are more strongly
influenced by object lessons than by theories. The effect on men of
such an object lesson as the following will be apparent. Suppose that
two men, named respectively Smart and Honest, are at work by the day
and receive the same pay, say 20 cents per hour. Each of these men is
given a new piece of work which could be done in one hour. Smart
does his job in four hours (and it is by no means unusual for men to
soldier to this extent). Honest does his in one and one-half hours.
Now, when these two jobs start on this basis under the Towne-Halsey
plan and are ultimately done in one hour each, Smart receives for his
job 20 cents per hour + a premium of 20 cents = a total of 40 cents.
Honest receives for his job 20 cents per hour + a premium of 3 1/8
cents = a total of 23 1/8 cents.
Most of the men in the shop will follow the example of Smart rather
than that of Honest and will "soldier" to the extent of three or four
hundred per cent if allowed to do so. The Towne-Halsey system shares
with ordinary piece work then, the greatest evil of the latter, namely
that its very foundation rests upon deceit, and under both of these
systems there is necessarily, as we have seen, a great lack of justice and
equality in the starting-point of different jobs.
Some of the rates will have resulted from records obtained when a
first-class man was working close to his maximum speed, while others
will be based on the performance of a poor man at one-third or one
quarter speed.
The injustice of the very foundation of the system is thus forced upon
the workman every day of his life, and no man, however kindly
disposed he may be toward his employer, can fail to resent this and be
seriously influenced by it in his work. These systems are, therefore, of
necessity slow and irregular in their operation in reducing costs. They

"drift" gradually toward an increased output, but under them the
attainment of the maximum output of a first-class man is almost
impossible.
Objection has been made to the use of the word "drifting" in this
connection. It is used absolutely without any intention of slurring the
Towne-Halsey system or in the least detracting from its true merit.
It appears to me, however, that "drifting" very accurately describes it,
for the reason that the management, having turned over the entire
control of the speed problem to the men, the latter being influenced by
their prejudices and whims, drift sometimes in one direction and
sometimes in another; but on the whole, sooner or later, under the
stimulus of the premium, move toward a higher rate of speed. This
drifting, accompanied as it is by the irregularity and uncertainty both as
to the final result which will be attained and as to how long it will take
to reach this end, is in marked contrast to the distinct goal which is
always kept in plain sight of both parties under task management, and
the clear-cut directions which leave no doubt as to the means which are
to be employed nor the time in which the work must be done; and these
elements constitute the fundamental difference between the two
systems. Mr. Halsey, in objecting to the use of the word "drifting" as
describing his system, has referred to the use of his system in England
in connection with a "rate-fixing" or planning department, and quotes
as follows from his paper to show that he contemplated control of the
speed of the work by the management:
"On contract work undertaken for the first time the method is the same
except that the premium is based on the estimated time for the
execution of the