Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism | Page 9

East.
[1] Galen VIII. 751.
[2] Bekker Index.
The books of Sextus Empiricus furnish us with the best and fullest presentation of ancient Scepticism which has been preserved to modern times, and give Sextus the position of one of the greatest men of the Sceptical School. His works which are still extant are the Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes in three volumes, and the two works comprising eleven books which have been united in later times under the title of [Greek: pros mathêmatikous], one of which is directed against the sciences in general, and the other against the dogmatic philosophers. The six books composing the first of these are written respectively against grammarians, rhetoricians, geometricians, arithmeticians, astronomers and musicians. The five books of the latter consist of two against the logicians, two against physics, and one against systems of morals. If the last short work of the first book directed against the arithmeticians is combined with the one preceding against the geometricians, as it well could be, the two works together would be divided into ten different parts; there is evidence to show that in ancient times such a division was made.[1] There were two other works of Sextus which are now lost, the medical work before referred to, and a book entitled [Greek: peri psuchês]. The character of the extant works of Sextus is similar, as they are all directed either against science or against the dogmatics, and they all present the negative side of Pyrrhonism. The vast array of arguments comprising the subject-matter, often repeated in the same and different forms, are evidently taken largely from the Sceptical works which Sextus had resource to, and are, in fact, a summing up of all the wisdom of the Sceptical School. The style of these books is fluent, and the Greek reminds one of Plutarch and Thucydides, and although Sextus does not claim originality, but presents in all cases the arguments of the Sceptic, yet the illustrations and the form in which the arguments are presented, often bear the marks of his own thought, and are characterized here and there by a wealth of humor that has not been sufficiently noticed in the critical works on Sextus. Of all the authors who have reviewed Sextus, Brochard is the only one who seems to have understood and appreciated his humorous side.
We shall now proceed to the consideration of the general position and aim of Pyrrhonism.
[1] Diog. IX. 12, 116.
CHAPTER II.
The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism.
The first volume of the Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes gives the most complete statement found in any of the works of Sextus Empiricus of the teachings of Pyrrhonism and its relation to other schools of philosophy. The chief source of the subject-matter presented is a work of the same name by Aenesidemus,[1] either directly used by Sextus, or through the writings of those who followed Aenesidemus. The comprehensive title [Greek: Purrh?neioi hupotup?seis] was very probably used in general to designate courses of lectures given by the leaders of the Sceptical School.
In the opening chapters of the Hypotyposes Sextus undertakes to define the position and aim of Pyrrhonism.[2] In introducing his subject he treats briefly of the differences between philosophical schools, dividing them into three classes; those which claim that they have found the truth, like the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics; those which deny the possibility of finding it, like that of the Academicians; and those that still seek it, like the Sceptical School. The accusation against the Academicians, that they denied the possibility of finding the truth, was one that the Sceptics were very fond of making. We shall discuss the justice of it later, simply remarking here, that to affirm the "incomprehensibility of the unknown," was a form of expression that the Pyrrhonists themselves were sometimes betrayed into, notwithstanding their careful avoidance of dogmatic statements.[3]
[1] Diog. IX. 11, 78.
[2] Hyp. I. 3, 4.
[3] Adv. Math. VIII. 191.
After defining the three kinds of philosophy as the Dogmatic, the Academic and the Sceptic, Sextus reminds his hearers that he does not speak dogmatically in anything that he says, but that he intends simply to present the Sceptical arguments historically, and as they appear to him. He characterizes his treatment of the subject as general rather than critical, including a statement of the character of Scepticism, its idea, its principles, its manner of reasoning, its criterion and aim, and a presentation of the Tropes, or aspects of doubt, and the Sceptical formulae and the distinction between Scepticism and the related schools of philosophy.[1]
The result of all the gradual changes which the development of thought had brought about in the outward relations of the Sceptical School, was to increase the earnestness of the claim of the Sceptics to be simply followers of Pyrrho, the great founder of the movement. In discussing the names given