Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914 | Page 3

is one thing, and the excesses admitted to have been
committed in consequence of this pretended right, is another; but surely,

Sir, reasoning from inferences and implication only, is below the
dignity of your proceedings, upon a right of this vast importance. What
this reparation is, what sort of composition for your losses, forced upon
you by Spain, in an instance that has come to light, where your own
commissaries could not in conscience decide against your claim, has
fully appeared upon examination; and, as for the payment of the sum
stipulated (all but seven and twenty thousand pounds, and that, too,
subject to a drawback), it is evidently a fallacious nominal payment
only. I will not attempt to enter into the detail of a dark, confused, and
scarcely intelligible account; I will only beg leave to conclude with one
word upon it, in the light of a submission, as well as of an adequate
reparation. Spain stipulates to pay to the Crown of England ninety-five
thousand pounds; by a preliminary protest of the King of Spain, the
South Sea Company is at once to pay sixty-eight thousand of it: if they
refuse, Spain, I admit, is still to pay the ninety-five thousand
pounds--but how does it stand then? The Assiento contract is to be
suspended; you are to purchase this sum at the price of an exclusive
trade, pursuant to a national treaty, and of an immense debt of God
knows how many hundred thousand pounds due from Spain to the
South Sea Company. Here, Sir, is the submission of Spain, by the
payment of a stipulated sum; a tax laid upon subjects of England, under
the severest penalties, with the reciprocal accord of an English minister,
as a preliminary that the convention may be signed; a condition
imposed by Spain in the most absolute, imperious manner, and received
by the Ministers of England in the most tame and abject. Can any
verbal distinctions, any evasions whatever, possibly explain away this
public infamy? To whom would we disguise it? To ourselves and to the
nation. I wish we could hide it from the eyes of every court in Europe.
They see Spain has talked to you like your master; they see this
arbitrary fundamental condition, and it must stand with distinction,
with a pre-eminence of shame, as a part even of this convention.
This convention, Sir, I think from my soul, is nothing but a stipulation
for national ignominy; an illusory expedient, to baffle the resentment of
the nation; a truce without the suspension of hostilities on the part of
Spain; on the part of England a suspension, as to Georgia, of the first
law of nature, self-preservation and self-defence--surrender of the

rights and trade of England to the mercy of plenipotentiaries, and in
this infinitely highest and sacred point, future security, not only
inadequate, but directly repugnant to the resolutions of Parliament, and
the gracious promise from the Throne. The complaints of your
despairing merchants, the voice of England, has condemned it. Be the
guilt of it upon the head of the adviser. God forbid that this committee
should share the guilt by approving it!
[Footnote 1: The House of Commons, in a grand committee, in 1737,
had heard counsel for the merchants, and received evidence at the bar,
on the subject of the Spanish depredations.]

WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM JANUARY 22, 1770 THE
DEFENCE OF WEAKER STATES
My Lords, I cannot agree with the noble duke, that nothing less than an
immediate attack upon the honour or interest of this nation can
authorize us to interpose in defence of weaker states, and in stopping
the enterprises of an ambitious neighbour. Whenever that narrow,
selfish policy has prevailed in our councils, we have constantly
experienced the fatal effects of it. By suffering our natural enemies to
oppress the Powers less able than we are to make a resistance, we have
permitted them to increase their strength; we have lost the most
favourable opportunities of opposing them with success; and found
ourselves at last obliged to run every hazard, in making that cause our
own, in which we were not wise enough to take part while the expense
and danger might have been supported by others. With respect to
Corsica I shall only say, that France has obtained a more useful and
important acquisition in one pacific campaign, than in any of her
belligerent campaigns;[1] at least while I had the honour of
administering the war against her. The word may, perhaps, be thought
singular: I mean only while I was the minister chiefly entrusted with
the conduct of the war. I remember, my Lords, the time when Lorraine
was united to the Crown of France;[2] that too was, in some measure, a
pacific conquest; and there were, people