Select Speeches of Kossuth | Page 2

are cleared up in these
speeches. On two subjects only does it seem needful here to make any
remark: first, on the Republicanism of Kossuth; secondly, on the
Hungarian levies against Italy in the year 1848.
1. Kossuth is attacked by his countrymen on opposite grounds:
Szemerè despises him for not becoming a republican early enough,
Count Casimir Bathyanyi reproves him for becoming a republican at all.
The facts are these. Kossuth, like all English statesmen, was a historical
royalist, not a doctrinaire. When the existing reign had become
treacherous and lawless, he was willing to change the line of succession,
and make the Archduke Stephen king. When the dynasty had become
universally detested and actually expelled, he approved most heartily[*]
the deposition of the Hapsburgs; but still held himself in suspense as to
the future of the constitution. By his influence instructions were sent to
his representative in England, which were equivalent to soliciting a
dynasty from the British government. Meanwhile Szemerè, his Home
Secretary, took on himself to avow in the Diet that the government was
REPUBLICAN, and no voice of protest was raised in either house.
Indeed, Mr. Vucovics, who was Minister of Justice under Kossuth,

states (see Appendix I.) that the government and both houses responded
unanimously to the republican avowal, and that the government
removed the symbol of the Crown from the public arms and seal. The
press of all shades assented. After this, it was clear (I presume) to
Kossuth, or at least it soon became so, that all sympathy with royal
power was gone out of the nation's heart. Hungarians may settle that
amongst themselves: but as for Englishmen,--when for seven or eight
months together the English ministry and English peerage would not
stir, or speak, or whisper, to save constitutional royalty and ancient
peerage for Hungary and for Europe while it was yet possible; with
what face, with what decency, can Englishmen censure Kossuth for
despairing of a cause, which was abandoned to ruin by ourselves, the
greatest power interested to maintain it,--which the monarchs have
waded through blood and perjury to destroy,-and which the millions of
Hungary will not (in his belief) peril life and fortune to restore?
[Footnote *: How unanimous was the whole country, is clear by the
facts stated. How spontaneous was the movement, and free from all
government intrigue, see in Appendix I. This is entirely confirmed by
our envoy, Mr. Blackwell: Blue Book, March--Ap. 1848.]
2. The ministry of Louis Bathyanyi and Kossuth have been attacked on
opposite grounds,--because they did, and because they did not, attempt
to subdue the Italians by force of arms. The facts are rather complicated,
but deserve here to be stated concisely.
When the ministry was appointed, there were already Hungarians in
Italy with Radetzki, and Austrian soldiers in Hungary. The Viennese
ministry promised to exchange them, as fast as could be done without
encountering great expense or dislocating the regiments and making
them inefficient. With this promise the Hungarian ministry was forced
to content itself at the time. At a later period, when it discovered that
the Austrian commanders in Hungary had secret orders not to fight
against the Serbian marauders, and that the Austrian troops could not
be trusted, the Hungarian ministry desired to get back their men from
Italy for their own defence; which desire proved ineffectual, yet has
been severely blamed by some of our monarchists. But meanwhile the
Viennese ministry, as early as June, 1848, endeavoured to buy of the
Hungarian ministry an increased grant of troops against Italy, by
conceding a most energetic "King's Speech" against the Serbs, with

which the Archduke Palatine was to open, and did open, the Diet on
July 2d. A part of this speech is quoted in Appendix II., and indeed it is
a loathsome exhibition of Austrian treachery. The Hungarian ministry
were pressed by the arguments, that since Austria was attacked in Italy
by the King of Sardinia, the war was not merely against the Lombards;
and that the Pragmatic Sanction bound Hungary to defend the empire if
assailed from without. This led them to acknowledge the principle, that
they were bound to assist, if able; but they replied that Hungary itself
must first be secured against marauders, and no troops could be spared
until the Serbs were subdued. At the same time orders were sent to
Radetzki from Vienna to offer independence to the Lombards, and
constitutional nationality under the Austrian crown to the Venetians:
hence the Hungarian ministry for a time fancied that they would not be
fighting against the Italians, as they expected the terms to be accepted
by them. When it was farther represented that the Italians had rejected
them,--(for Radetzki, acting probably by secret orders, suppressed the
despatches, and never offered independence to Lombardy, though the