Sea-Power and Other Studies | Page 8

as serious as the rule
above mentioned would lead us to expect that they would be. 'With the
conquest of Syria and Egypt a long stretch of sea-board had come into
the Saracenic power; and the creation and maintenance of a navy for
the protection of the maritime ports as well as for meeting the enemy
became a matter of vital importance. Great attention was paid to the

manning and equipment of the fleet.'[26] At first the fleet was manned
by sailors drawn from the Phoenician towns where nautical energy was
not yet quite extinct; and later the crews were recruited from Syria,
Egypt, and the coasts of Asia Minor. Ships were built at most of the
Syrian and Egyptian ports, and also at Obolla and Bushire on the
Persian Gulf,' whilst the mercantile marine and maritime trade were
fostered and encouraged. The sea-power thus created was largely
artificial. It drooped--as in similar cases--when the special
encouragement was withdrawn. 'In the days of Arabian energy,' says
Hallam, 'Constantinople was twice, in 668 and 716, attacked by great
naval armaments.' The same authority believes that the abandonment of
such maritime enterprises by the Saracens may be attributed to the
removal of the capital from Damascus to Bagdad. The removal
indicated a lessened interest in the affairs of the Mediterranean Sea,
which was now left by the administration far behind. 'The Greeks in
their turn determined to dispute the command of the sea,' with the result
that in the middle of the tenth century their empire was far more secure
from its enemies than under the first successors of Heraclius. Not only
was the fall of the empire, by a rational reliance on sea-power,
postponed for centuries, but also much that had been lost was regained.
'At the close of the tenth century the emperors of Constantinople
possessed the best and greatest part' of Southern Italy, part of Sicily, the
whole of what is now called the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor, with
some parts of Syria and Armenia.[27]
[Footnote 25: Hallam, _Mid.Ages, chap. vi.]
[Footnote 26: Ameer Ali, Syed, _Short_Hist.Saracens, p. 442]
[Footnote 27: Hallam, chap. vi.; Gibbon, chap. li.]
Neglect of sea-power by those who can be reached by sea brings its
own punishment. Whether neglected or not, if it is an artificial creation
it is nearly sure to disappoint those who wield it when it encounters a
rival power of natural growth. How was it possible for the Crusaders, in
their various expeditions, to achieve even the transient success that
occasionally crowned their efforts? How did the Christian kingdom of
Jerusalem contrive to exist for more than three-quarters of a century?
Why did the Crusades more and more become maritime expeditions?
The answer to these questions is to be found in the decline of the
Mohammedan naval defences and the rising enterprise of the seafaring

people of the West. Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese transported
crusading forces, kept open the communications of the places held by
the Christians, and hampered the operations of the infidels. Even the
great Saladin failed to discern the important alteration of conditions.
This is evident when we look at the efforts of the Christians to regain
the lost kingdom. Saladin 'forgot that the safety of Phoenicia lay in
immunity from naval incursions, and that no victory on land could
ensure him against an influx from beyond the sea.'[28] Not only were
the Crusaders helped by the fleets of the maritime republics of Italy,
they also received reinforcements by sea from western Europe and
England, on the 'arrival of _MalikAnkiltar (Richard Coeur de Lion)
with twenty shiploads of fighting men and munitions of war.'
[Footnote 28: Ameer Ali, Syed, pp. 359, 360.]
Participation in the Crusades was not a solitary proof of the importance
of the naval states of Italy. That they had been able to act effectively in
the Levant may have been in some measure due to the weakening of the
Mohammedans by the disintegration of the Seljukian power, the
movements of the Moguls, and the confusion consequent on the rise of
the Ottomans. However that may have been, the naval strength of those
Italian states was great absolutely as well as relatively. Sismondi,
speaking of Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, towards the end of the eleventh
century, says 'these three cities had more vessels on the Mediterranean
than the whole of Christendom besides.'[29] Dealing with a period two
centuries later, he declares it 'difficult to comprehend how two simple
cities could put to sea such prodigious fleets as those of Pisa and
Genoa.' The difficulty disappears when we have Mahan's explanation.
The maritime republics of Italy--like Athens and Rhodes in ancient,
Catalonia in mediæval, and England and the Netherlands in more
modern times--were 'peculiarly well fitted, by situation and resources,
for the control of the sea by