Science and Education | Page 9

or to attack Priestley's philosophical
views, and I cannot say that I am personally disposed to attach much
value to episcopal authority in philosophical questions; but it seems
right to call attention to the fact, that those of Priestley's opinions which
have brought most odium upon him have been openly promulgated,
without challenge, by persons occupying the highest positions in the
State Church.
I must confess that what interests me most about Priestley's materialism,
is the evidence that he saw dimly the seed of destruction which such
materialism carries within its own bosom. In the course of his reading
for his "History of Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and Colours,"
he had come upon the speculations of Boscovich and Michell, and had
been led to admit the sufficiently obvious truth that our knowledge of
matter is a knowledge of its properties; and that of its substance--if it
have a substance--we know nothing. And this led to the further
admission that, so far as we can know, there may be no difference
between the substance of matter and the substance of spirit
("Disquisitions," p. 16). A step farther would have shown Priestley that
his materialism was, essentially, very little different from the Idealism
of his contemporary, the Bishop of Cloyne.
As Priestley's philosophy is mainly a clear statement of the views of the
deeper thinkers of his day, so are his political conceptions based upon
those of Locke. Locke's aphorism that "the end of government is the
good of mankind," is thus expanded by Priestley:--
"It must necessarily be understood, therefore, whether it be expressed
or not, that all people live in society for their mutual advantage; so that
the good and happiness of the members, that is, of the majority of the
members, of any state, is the great standard by which everything
relating to that state must finally be determined." [15]
The little sentence here interpolated, "that is, of the majority of the
members of any state," appears to be that passage which suggested to
Bentham, according to his own acknowledgment, the famous "greatest
happiness" formula, which by substituting "happiness" for "good," has
converted a noble into an ignoble principle. But I do not call to mind

that there is any utterance in Locke quite so outspoken as the following
passage in the "Essay on the First Principles of Government." After
laying down as "a fundamental maxim in all Governments," the
proposition that "kings, senators, and nobles" are "the servants of the
public," Priestley goes on to say:--
"But in the largest states, if the abuses of the government should at any
time be great and manifest; if the servants of the people, forgetting their
masters and their masters' interest, should pursue a separate one of their
own; if, instead of considering that they are made for the people, they
should consider the people as made for them; if the oppressions and
violation of right should be great, flagrant, and universally resented; if
the tyrannical governors should have no friends but a few sycophants,
who had long preyed upon the vitals of their fellow-citizens, and who
might be expected to desert a government whenever their interests
should be detached from it: if, in consequence of these circumstances, it
should become manifest that the risk which would be run in attempting
a revolution would be trifling, and the evils which might be
apprehended from it were far less than those which were actually
suffered and which were daily increasing; in the name of God, I ask,
what principles are those which ought to restrain an injured and
insulted people from asserting their natural rights, and from changing
or even punishing their governors--that is, their servants--who had
abused their trust, or from altering the whole form of their government,
if it appeared to be of a structure so liable to abuse?"
As a Dissenter, subject to the operation of the Corporation and Test
Acts, and as a Unitarian excluded from the benefit of the Toleration Act,
it is not surprising to find that Priestley had very definite opinions
about Ecclesiastical Establishments; the only wonder is that these
opinions were so moderate as the following passages show them to
have been:--
"Ecclesiastical authority may have been necessary in the infant state of
society, and, for the same reason, it may perhaps continue to be, in
some degree, necessary as long as society is imperfect; and therefore
may not be entirely abolished till civil governments have arrived at a
much greater degree of perfection. If, therefore, I were asked whether I
should approve of the immediate dissolution of all the ecclesiastical
establishments in Europe, I should answer, No.... Let experiment be

first made of alterations, or, which is the same thing, of better
establishments than the present. Let them be reformed in many
essential articles,