Rudolph Eucken | Page 7

this stage of the
development of the sciences was very great, for he had come to
appreciate more than before the superiority of the human soul over the
material world. Hence resulted a more robust type of life, "a life
energetic, masculine, pressing forward unceasingly." Matters, however,
were not destined to remain long at this stage. As man's knowledge of
the processes of nature increased further, a twofold result followed. On
the one hand, the sense world of nature became increasingly absorbing
in interest; on the other hand, laws were formulated and nature was
conceived of as being a chain of cause and effect, a combination of

mechanical elements whose interactions were according to law, and
could be foretold with the utmost precision.
These two factors worked in the same direction, namely, that of
rendering less necessary the conception of a spiritual world. The
interest of mankind became so concentrated upon material things that
the interest in the invisible decreased, while the mechanical, soulless
elements with their ceaseless actions and reactions in definite order,
and according to inviolable law, were held sufficient to account for the
phenomena of nature. The keynote was "relation to environment"; a
constantly changing environment, changing according to law, called for
ceaseless readjustment, and the adaptation to environment was held to
be the stimulus to all activity in the natural world.
The later development of biology, and the doctrine of the evolution of
species, gradually extended this conception of nature to include man
himself.
What he had regarded as his distinctive characteristics were held to be
but the product of natural factors, and his life was regarded, too, as
under the domain of rigid, inviolable law. There was no room for, and
no need of, the conception of free, originative thought. Thought was
simply an answer to the demand that the sense world was making,
entirely dependent upon the external stimulus, just as any other activity
was entirely dependent on an external stimulus. So thought came to be
regarded as resulting from mere sense impression, which latter
corresponded to the external stimulus. It is obvious that the idea of the
freedom of the human soul, and of human personality as previously
understood, had to go. Man was simply the result of the interaction of
numerous causes--and like the rest of nature, involved no independent
spiritual element. Everything that was previously regarded as spiritual
was interpreted as a mere adjunct to, or a shadow of, the sense world.
Such a conception accounted for the whole of nature and of man, and
so became an explanation of the universe, a philosophy.
In such a theory self-preservation becomes the aim of life, the struggle
for existence the driving-power, and adaptation to environment the
means to the desired end. Hence it comes about that only one standard

of value remains, that of usefulness, for that alone can be regarded as
valuable which proves to be useful towards the preservation and
enjoyment of the natural life. The ideas of the good, the beautiful, and
the true, lose the glory of their original meaning, and become
comparatively barren conceptions. Hence at a stroke the spiritual world
is wiped away, the soul of man is degraded from its high position, the
great truths of religion are cast aside as mere illusions.
The naturalistic explanation possesses the apparent advantage of being
a very simple one, and hence attracts the human mind with great force
in the early stages of mental culture. All the difficulties of the
conception of a higher world are absent, for the naturalistic position
does not admit of its existence. It gives, too, some purpose to life, even
though that purpose is not an ideal one.
Eucken is not reluctant to give the theory all the credit it deserves, and
he is prepared to admit that it fulfils to some extent the conditions
which he holds a satisfactory solution should fulfil.
He goes, however, immediately to the root of the matter, and finds that
the very existence of the theory of naturalism in itself is an eloquent
disproof of the theory. The existence of a comprehensive scientific
conception involves an activity which is far superior to nature itself, for
it can make nature the object of systematic study. An intellect which is
nothing more than a mirror of sense impressions can get little beyond
such sense impressions, whereas the highly developed scientific
conception of nature that obtains to-day is far beyond a mere collection
of sense impressions. Nature, indeed, is subdued and mastered by man;
why then degrade man to the level of a universe he has mastered? To
produce from the phenomena of nature a scientific conception of nature
demands the activity of an independent, originative power of thought,
which, though it may be conditioned by, and must be related to, sense