Protagoras | Page 4

will appear virtuous and just, if we
compare them with savages. (5) The error of Socrates lies in supposing
that there are no teachers of virtue, whereas all men are teachers in a
degree. Some, like Protagoras, are better than others, and with this
result we ought to be satisfied.
Socrates is highly delighted with the explanation of Protagoras. But he
has still a doubt lingering in his mind. Protagoras has spoken of the
virtues: are they many, or one? are they parts of a whole, or different
names of the same thing? Protagoras replies that they are parts, like the
parts of a face, which have their several functions, and no one part is
like any other part. This admission, which has been somewhat hastily
made, is now taken up and cross-examined by Socrates:--
'Is justice just, and is holiness holy? And are justice and holiness
opposed to one another?'--'Then justice is unholy.' Protagoras would
rather say that justice is different from holiness, and yet in a certain
point of view nearly the same. He does not, however, escape in this
way from the cunning of Socrates, who inveigles him into an admission
that everything has but one opposite. Folly, for example, is opposed to
wisdom; and folly is also opposed to temperance; and therefore
temperance and wisdom are the same. And holiness has been already
admitted to be nearly the same as justice. Temperance, therefore, has
now to be compared with justice.
Protagoras, whose temper begins to get a little ruffled at the process to
which he has been subjected, is aware that he will soon be compelled
by the dialectics of Socrates to admit that the temperate is the just. He
therefore defends himself with his favourite weapon; that is to say, he

makes a long speech not much to the point, which elicits the applause
of the audience.
Here occurs a sort of interlude, which commences with a declaration on
the part of Socrates that he cannot follow a long speech, and therefore
he must beg Protagoras to speak shorter. As Protagoras declines to
accommodate him, he rises to depart, but is detained by Callias, who
thinks him unreasonable in not allowing Protagoras the liberty which
he takes himself of speaking as he likes. But Alcibiades answers that
the two cases are not parallel. For Socrates admits his inability to speak
long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak
short?
Counsels of moderation are urged first in a few words by Critias, and
then by Prodicus in balanced and sententious language: and Hippias
proposes an umpire. But who is to be the umpire? rejoins Socrates; he
would rather suggest as a compromise that Protagoras shall ask and he
will answer, and that when Protagoras is tired of asking he himself will
ask and Protagoras shall answer. To this the latter yields a reluctant
assent.
Protagoras selects as his thesis a poem of Simonides of Ceos, in which
he professes to find a contradiction. First the poet says,
'Hard is it to become good,'
and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, 'Hard is it to be good.'
How is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who is familiar with the poem,
is embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus, the countryman
of Simonides, but apparently only with the intention of flattering him
into absurdities. First a distinction is drawn between (Greek) to be, and
(Greek) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good is easy.
Then the word difficult or hard is explained to mean 'evil' in the Cean
dialect. To all this Prodicus assents; but when Protagoras reclaims,
Socrates slily withdraws Prodicus from the fray, under the pretence that
his assent was only intended to test the wits of his adversary. He then
proceeds to give another and more elaborate explanation of the whole
passage. The explanation is as follows:--
The Lacedaemonians are great philosophers (although this is a fact
which is not generally known); and the soul of their philosophy is
brevity, which was also the style of primitive antiquity and of the seven
sages. Now Pittacus had a saying, 'Hard is it to be good:' and Simonides,

who was jealous of the fame of this saying, wrote a poem which was
designed to controvert it. No, says he, Pittacus; not 'hard to be good,'
but 'hard to become good.' Socrates proceeds to argue in a highly
impressive manner that the whole composition is intended as an attack
upon Pittacus. This, though manifestly absurd, is accepted by the
company, and meets with the special approval of Hippias, who has
however a favourite interpretation of his own, which he is requested by
Alcibiades to defer.
The argument is now resumed, not without some disdainful remarks of
Socrates on the practice of introducing