Proportional Representation | Page 7

his choice upon many other questions of first-class
importance--the constitution of a new Second Chamber, Home Rule for
Ireland, the maintenance of Free Trade, the establishment of an
Imperial Preference, Electoral Reform, the reversal or modification of
the Osborne Judgment, Payment of Members, Invalidity Insurance; in
respect of all of which legislative proposals might possibly be
submitted to the new Parliament. Obviously before the House of
Commons can be regarded with complete confidence as the expression
of the national will, the elector must be given a wider and more
effective choice in the selection of a representative.
It is, however, contended by many politicians that the main object of a
General Election is not the creation of a legislature which shall give
expression to the views of electors on public questions. "A General
Election," says the Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral
Systems,[4] "is in fact considered by a large portion of the electorate as
practically a referendum on the question which of two Governments
shall be returned to power." But were this interpretation of a General
Election accepted it would destroy the grounds on which it is claimed
that the decisions of the Commons in respect of legislation shall prevail
"within the limit of a single Parliament." Some means should be
available for controlling the Government in respect of its legislative
proposals, and the history of the Unionist administrations of 1895-1906,
during which the House of Lords failed to exercise any such control,
demonstrated the need of a check upon the action of a House of
Commons elected under present conditions. Mr. John M. Robertson,
whose democratic leanings are not open to the least suspicion, has
commented in this sense upon the lack of confidence in the
representative character of the House of Commons. "Let me remind
you," said he, "that the state of things in which the Progressive party
can get in on a tidal movement of political feeling with a majority of
200, causes deep misgivings in the minds of many electors.... Those
who desire an effective limitation of the power of the House of Lords
and its ultimate abolition, are bound to offer to the great mass of
prudent electors some measure of electoral reform which will give
greater stability to the results of the polls, and will make the results at a

General Election more in keeping with the actual balance of opinion in
the country." [5] The preamble of the Parliament Bill itself implies that
the decisions of the House of Commons may not always be in
accordance with the national wishes. It foreshadows the creation of a
new Second Chamber, and the only purpose which this chamber can
serve is to make good the deficiencies of the First.
The fact that our electoral methods are so faulty that their results
produce in the minds of many electors deep misgivings as to the
representative character of the House of Commons must materially
undermine the authority of that House. All who desire the final and
complete triumph of representative institutions--a triumph that depends
upon their success in meeting the demands made upon them--all who
are anxious that the House of Commons shall not only maintain, but
increase, the prestige that has hitherto been associated with it, must, in
the face of possible constitutional developments, endeavour to
strengthen its position by making it in fact, as it is in theory, fully
representative of the nation. For Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's
quotation from Burke is double-edged, and may be expressed thus: "the
virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons departs as soon
as it ceases to be the express image of the nation." Such a House cannot
furnish an adequate basis of support for a Government. For the
Government which issues from it will not command public confidence.
The debates in the House in 1905, before the resignation of Mr. Balfour,
bore testimony to the fact that the strength and power of a Government
which, according to the theory of our constitution, depends upon the
number of its supporters in the House of Commons, in reality rests
upon its reputation with the country. There was quoted more than once
with excellent effect this dictum of Sir William Anson: "Ministers are
not only the servants of the Crown, they represent the public opinion of
the United Kingdom. When they cease to impersonate public opinion
they become a mere group of personages who must stand or fall by the
prudence and success of their actions. They have to deal with disorders
at home or hostile manifestations abroad; they would have to meet
these with the knowledge that they had not the confidence or support of
the country; and their opponents at home and abroad would know this
too." [6] The strength and stability of a democratic Government