Progressive Morality | Page 8

in a scientific form, they introduce
needless complexity and obscurity.
If the statements thus far made in this chapter be accepted, it follows
that the feelings of self-approbation and self-disapprobation, which
constitute the moral sanction, by no means invariably supervene on acts
of the same kind even in the case of the same individual, much less in
the case of different individuals, and that the acts which elicit the moral
sanction depend, to a considerable extent, on the circumstances and
education of the person who passes judgment on them. The moral
sanction, therefore, though it always consists in the feelings of
self-approbation, or self-disapprobation, of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction at one's own acts, is neither uniform, absolute, nor
infallible; but varies, as applied not only by different individuals but by
the same individual at different times, in relation to varying conditions
of education, temperament, nationality, and, generally, of
circumstances both external and internal. Lastly, it admits of constant
improvement and correction. How, then, it may be asked, do we justify
the application of this sanction, and why do we regard it as not only a
legitimate sanction of conduct, but as the most important of all
sanctions, and, in cases of conflict, the supreme and final sanction?

The answer to this question is that, if we regard an action as wrong, no
matter whether our opinion be correct or not, no external considerations
whatsoever can compensate us for acting contrary to our convictions.
Human nature, in its normal condition, is so constituted that the
remorse felt, when we look back upon a wrong action, far outweighs
any pleasure we may have derived from it, just as the satisfaction with
which we look back upon a right action far more than compensates for
any pain with which it may have been attended. The 'mens sibi conscia
recti' is the highest reward which a man can have, as, on the other hand,
the retrospect on base, unjust, or cruel actions constitutes the most
acute of torments. Now, when a man looks back upon his past actions,
what he regards is not so much the result of his acts as the intention and
the motives by which the intention was actuated. It is not, therefore,
what he would now think of the act so much as what he then thought of
it that is the object of his approbation or disapprobation. And,
consequently, even though his opinions as to the nature of the act may
meanwhile have undergone alteration, he approves or disapproves of
what was his intention at the moment of performing it and of the state
of mind from which it then proceeded. It is true that the subsequent
results of our acts and any change in our estimate of their moral
character may considerably modify the feelings with which we look
back upon them, but, still, in the main, it holds good that the approval
or disapproval with which we regard our past conduct depends rather
upon the opinions of right and wrong which we entertained at the
moment of action than those which we have come to entertain since. To
have acted, at any time, in a manner contrary to what we then supposed
to be right leaves behind it a trace of dissatisfaction and pain, which
may, at any future time, reappear to trouble and distress us; just as to
have acted, in spite of all conflicting considerations, in a manner which
we then conceived to be right, may, in after years, be a perennial source
of pleasure and satisfaction. It is characteristic of the pleasures and
pains of reflexion on our past acts (which pleasures and pains of
reflexion may, of course, connect themselves with other than purely
moral considerations), not only that they admit of being more intense
than any other pleasures and pains, but that, whenever there is any
conflict between the moral sanction and any other sanction, it is to the
moral sanction that they attach themselves. Thus, if a man has incurred

physical suffering, or braved the penalties of the law or the ill word of
society, in pursuance of a course of conduct which he deemed to be
right, he looks back upon his actions with satisfaction, and the more
important the actions, and the clearer his convictions of right and the
stronger the inducements to act otherwise, the more intense will his
satisfaction be. But no such satisfaction is felt, when a man has
sacrificed his convictions of right to avoid physical pain, or to escape
the penalties of the law, or to conciliate the goodwill of society; the
feeling, on the other hand, will be that of dissatisfaction with himself,
varying, according to circumstances, from regret to remorse. And, if no
similar remark has to be made with reference to the religious sanction,