Progressive Morality | Page 3

of life have any
temptation to commit, say, an act of theft, and, if they experienced any
such temptation, they would be at least as likely to be restrained by the
consideration of what their neighbours would think or say about them,
even apart from their own moral and religious convictions, as by the
fear of imprisonment.

[Footnote 1: There are a few exceptions to the rule that the sanctions
employed by the state assume the form of punishments rather than of
rewards. Such are titles and honours, pensions awarded for
distinguished service, rewards to informers, &c. But these exceptions
are almost insignificant, when compared with the numerous examples
of the general rule.]
One of the most effective sanctions in all conditions of life, but
especially in the upper and better educated circles of a civilized society,
is what may be called the social sanction, that is to say, a regard for the
good opinion and a dread of the evil opinion of those who know us, and
especially of those amongst whom we habitually live. It is one of the
characteristics of this sanction that it is much more far-reaching than
the legal sanction. Not only does it extend to many acts of a moral
character which are not affected, in most countries, by the legal
sanction, such as lying, backbiting, ingratitude, unkindness, cowardice,
but also to mere matters of taste or fashion, such as dress, etiquette, and
even the proprieties of language. Indeed, as to the latter class of actions,
there is always considerable danger of the social sanction becoming too
strong. Society is apt to insist on all men being cast in one mould,
without much caring to examine the character of the mould which it has
adopted. And it frequently happens that a wholly disproportionate value
thus comes to be attached to the observance of mere rules of etiquette
and good-breeding as compared with acts and feelings which really
concern the moral and social welfare of mankind. There is many a man,
moving in good society, who would rather be guilty of, and even
detected in, an act of unkindness or mendacity, than be seen in an
unfashionable dress or commit a grammatical solecism or a broach of
social etiquette. Vulgarity to such men is a worse reproach than
hardness of heart or indifferent morality. In these cases, as we shall see
hereafter, the social sanction requires to be corrected by the moral and
religious sanctions, and it is the special province of the moral and
religious teacher in each generation to take care that this correction
shall be duly and effectively applied. The task may, from time to time,
require the drastic hand of the moral or religious reformer, but, unless
some one has the courage to undertake it, we are in constant danger of
neglecting the weightier matters of the law, while we are busy with the

mint and cummin and anise of fashion and convention. But,
notwithstanding the danger of exaggeration and misapplication, there
can be no doubt of the vast importance and the generally beneficial
results of a keen sensitiveness to the opinions of our fellow-men.
Without the powerful aid of this sanction, the restraints of morality and
religion would often be totally ineffective.
When the social sanction operates, not through society generally, but
through particular sections of society, it may be called a Law of Honour,
a term which originated in the usages of Chivalry. In a complex and
civilized form of society, such as our own, there may be many such
laws of honour, and the same individual may be subject to several of
them. Thus each profession, the army, the navy, the clerical, the legal,
the medical, the artistic, the dramatic profession, has its own peculiar
code of honour or rules of professional etiquette, which its members
can only infringe on pain of ostracism, or, at least, of loss of
professional reputation. The same is the case with trades, and is
specially exemplified in the instance of trades-unions, or, their
mediaeval prototypes, the guilds. A college or a school, again, has its
own rules and traditions, which the tutor or undergraduate, the master
or boy, can often only violate at his extreme peril. Almost every club,
institution, and society affords another instance in point. The class of
'gentlemen,' too, that is to say, speaking roughly, the upper and upper
middle ranks of society, claim to have a code of honour of their own,
superior to that of the ordinary citizen. A breach of this code is called
'ungentlemanly' rather than wrong or immoral or unjust or unkind. So
far as this code insists on courtesy of demeanour and delicacy of
feeling and conduct, it is a valuable complement to the ordinary rules
of morality, though, so far as it fulfils this