Probabilities | Page 4

me to the end patiently; with me,
convinced of what ([Greek: kat' exochên]) is Truth, by far surer and
stronger arguments than any of the less considerations here expounded
as auxiliary thereto; to bear with me, and prove for themselves at this
penning of my thoughts (if haply I am helped in such high enterprise),
whether indeed those doctrines and histories which the Christian world
admit, were antecedently improbable, that is, unreasonable: whether, on
the contrary, there did not exist, prior to any manifestation of such facts
and doctrines, an exceeding likelihood that they would be so and so
developed: and whether on the whole, led by reason to the threshold of
faith, it may be worth while to encounter other arguments, which have
rendered probabilities now certain.
4. It is very material to keep in memory the only scope and object of
this essay. We do not pretend to add one jot of evidence, but only to
prepare the mind to receive evidence: we do not attempt to prove facts,
but only to accelerate their admission by the removal of prejudice. If a
bed-ridden meteorologist is told that it rains, he may or he may not
receive the fact from the force of testimony; but he will certainly be
more prëdisposed to receive it, if he finds that his weatherglass is
falling rather than rising. The fact remains the same, it rains; but the
mind--precluded by circumstances from positive personal assurance of
such fact, and able only to arrive at truth from exterior evidence--is in a
fitter state for belief of the fact from being already made aware that it
was probable. Let it not then be inferred, somewhat perversely, that
because antecedent probabilities are the staple of our present argument,
the theme itself, Religion, rests upon hypotheses so slender: it rests not
at all upon such straws as probabilities, but on posterior evidence far
more firm. What we now attempt is not to prop the ark, but favourably
to prëdispose the mind of any reckless Uzzah, who might otherwise

assail it; not to strengthen the weak places of religion, but to annul such
disinclination to receive Truth, as consists in prejudice and
misconception of its likelihood. The goodly ship is built upon the
stocks, the platforms are reared, and the cradle is ready; but mistaken
prëconceptions may scatter the incline with gravel-stones rather than
with grease, and thus put a needless hindrance to the launching:
whereas a clear idea that the probabilities are in favour, rather than the
reverse, will make all smooth, lubricate, and easy. If, then, we fail in
this attempt, no disservice whatever is done to Truth itself; no breach is
made in the walls, no mine sprung, no battlement dismantled; all the
evidences remain as they were; we have taken nothing away. Even
granting matters seemed anteriorily improbable, still, if evidence
proved them true, such anterior unlikelihood would entirely be merged
in the stoutly proven facts. Moreover, if we be adjudged to have
succeeded, we have added nothing to Truth itself; no, nor to its
outworks. That sacred temple stands complete, firm and glorious from
corner-stone to top-stone. We do but sweep away the rubbish at its base;
the drifting desert sands that choke its portals. We only serve that cause
(a most high privilege), by enlisting a prëjudgment in its favour. We
propose herein an auxiliary to evidence, not evidence itself; a
finger-post to point the way to faith; a little light of reason on its path.
The risk is really nothing; but the advantage, under favour, may be
much.
5. It is impossible to elude the discussion of topics, which in their direct
tendencies, or remoter inferences, may, to the author at least, prove
dangerous or disputable ground. If a "great door and effectual" is
opened to him, doubtless he will raise or meet with many adversaries.
Besides mere haters of his creed, despisers of his arguments, and
protestors, loud and fierce against his errors; he may possibly fall foul
of divers unintended heresies; he may stumble unwittingly on the relics
of exploded schisms; he may exhume controversies in metaphysical or
scholastical polemics, long and worthily extinct. If this be so, he can
only plead, _Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa_. But it is open
to him also to protest against the common critical folly of making an
offender for a word: of driving analogies on all four feet, and straining
thoughts beyond their due proportions. Above all, never let a reader stir

one inch beyond, far less against, his own judgment: if there seem to be
sufficient reasons, well: if otherwise, let me walk uncompanied. The
first step especially is felt to be a very difficult one; perhaps very
debatable: for aught I know, it may be merely a vain insect caught