Primitive Love and Love-Stories | Page 9

exalted. Then
there is the sentiment of admiration, respect, or reverence--in itself one
of considerable power, and which in this relation becomes in a high
degree active. There comes next the feeling called love of approbation.
To be preferred above all the world, and that by one admired beyond all
others, is to have the love of approbation gratified in a degree passing
every previous experience: especially as there is added that indirect
gratification of it which results from the preference being witnessed by
unconcerned persons. Further, the allied emotion of self-esteem comes
into play. To have succeeded in gaining such attachment from, and
sway over, another, is a proof of power which cannot fail agreeably to
excite the amour propre. Yet again the proprietary feeling has its share
in the general activity: there is the pleasure of possession--the two
belong to each other. Once more, the relation allows of an extended
liberty of action. Toward other persons a restrained behavior is
requisite. Round each there is a subtle boundary that may not be
crossed--an individuality on which none may trespass. But in this case
the barriers are thrown down; and thus the love of unrestrained activity

is gratified. Finally, there is an exaltation of the sympathies. Egoistic
pleasures of all kinds are doubled by another's sympathetic
participation; and the pleasures of another are added to the egoistic
pleasures. Thus, round the physical feeling forming the nucleus of the
whole, are gathered the feelings produced by personal beauty, that
constituting simple attachment, those of reverence, of love of
approbation, of self-esteem, of property, of love of freedom, of
sympathy. These, all greatly exalted, and severally tending to reflect
their excitements on one another, unite to form the mental state we call
love. And as each of them is itself comprehensive of multitudinous
states of consciousness, we may say that this passion fuses into one
immense aggregate most of the elementary excitations of which we are
capable; and that hence results its irresistible power."
Ribot has copied this analysis of love in his Psychologie des Sentiments
(p. 249), with the comment that it is the best known to him (1896) and
that he sees nothing to add or to take away from it. Inasmuch as it
forms merely an episodic illustration in course of a general argument, it
certainly bears witness to the keenness of Spencer's intellect. Yet I
cannot agree with Ribot that it is a complete analysis of love. It aided
me in conceiving the plan for my first book, but I soon found that it
covered only a small part of the ground. Of the ingredients as suggested
by him I accepted only two--Sympathy, and the feelings associated
with Personal Beauty. What he called love of approbation, self-esteem,
and pleasure of possession I subsummed under the name of Pride of
Conquest and Possession. Further reflection has convinced me that it
would have been wiser if, instead of treating Romantic Love as a phase
of affection (which, of course, was in itself quite correct), I had
followed Spencer's example and made affection one of the ingredients
of the amorous passion. In the present volume I have made the change
and added also Adoration, which includes what Spencer calls "the
sentiment of admiration, respect, or reverence," while calling attention
to the superlative phase of these sentiments which is so characteristic of
the lover, who does not say, "I respect you," but "I adore you." I may
therefore credit Spencer with having suggested three or four only of the
fourteen essential ingredients which I find in love.
ACTIVE IMPULSES MUST BE ADDED
The most important distinction between Spencer's analysis of love and

mine is that he treats it merely as a composite feeling, or a group of
emotions, whereas I treat it as a complex state of mind including not
only diverse feelings or sentiments--sympathy, admiration of beauty,
jealousy, affection--but the _active, altruistic impulses_ of gallantry
and self-sacrifice, which are really more essential to an understanding
of the essence of love, and a better test of it, than the sentiments named
by Spencer. He ignores also the absolutely essential traits of individual
preference and monopolism, besides coyness, hyperbole, the mixed
moods of hope and despair, and purity, with the diverse emotions
accompanying them. An effort to trace the evolution of the ingredients
of love was first made in my book, though in a fragmentary way, in
which respect the present volume will be found a great improvement.
Apart from the completion of the analysis of love, my most important
contribution to the study of this subject lies in the recognition of the
fact that, "love" being so vague and comprehensive a term, the only
satisfactory way of studying its evolution is to trace the evolution of
each of its ingredients separately, as I