Political and Literary essays, 1908-1913 | Page 9

central control under the British system
calls for some further remarks. It varies greatly in different localities.
Under the Indian system a council of experts is attached to the
Secretary of State in England. A good authority on this subject says[15]
that there can be no question of the advantage of this system.
No man, however experienced and laborious, could properly direct and
control the various interests of so vast an Empire, unless he were aided
by men with knowledge of different parts of the country, and
possessing an intimate acquaintance with the different and complicated
subjects involved in the government and welfare of so many
incongruous races.
On the assumption that India is to be governed from London, there can
be no doubt of the validity of this argument. But, as has been frequently
pointed out,[16] this system tends inevitably towards
over-centralisation, and if the British Government is to continue to
exercise a sort of [Greek: pantokratoria] to use an expressive Greek
phrase, over a number of outlying dependencies of very various types,
over-centralisation is a danger which should be carefully shunned. It is
wiser to obtain local knowledge from those on the spot, rather than
from those whose local experience must necessarily diminish in value
in direct proportion to the length of the period during which they have
been absent from the special locality, and who, moreover, are under a
strong temptation, after they leave the dependency, to exercise a
detailed control over their successors. It is greatly to be doubted,
therefore, whether, should the occasion arise, this portion of the Indian
system is deserving of reproduction.

There is, however, another portion of that system which is in every
respect admirable, and the creation of which bears the impress of that
keen political insight which, according to many Continental authorities,
is the birthright of the Anglo-Saxon race. India is governed locally by a
council composed mainly of officials who have passed their adult lives
in the country; but the Viceroy, and occasionally the legal and financial
members of Council, are sent from England and are usually chosen by
reason of their general qualifications, rather than on account of any
special knowledge of Indian affairs. This system avoids the dangers
consequent on over-centralisation, whilst at the same time it associates
with the administration of the country some individuals who are
personally imbued with the general principles of government which are
favoured by the central authority. Its tendency is to correct the defect
from which the officials employed in the outlying portions of the
Empire are most likely to suffer, namely, that of magnifying the
importance of some local event or consideration, and of unduly
neglecting arguments based on considerations of wider Imperial import.
It enhances the idea of proportion, which is one of the main qualities
necessary to any politician or governing body. Long attention to one
subject, or group of subjects, is apt to narrow the vision of specialists.
The adjunct of an element, which is not Anglo-Indian, to the Indian
Government acts as a corrective to this evil. The members of the
Government who are sent from England, if they have no local
experience, are at all events exempt from local prejudices. They bring
to bear on the questions which come before them a wide general
knowledge and, in many cases, the liberal spirit and vigorous common
sense which are acquired in the course of an English parliamentary
career.
It may be added, as a matter of important detail, that it would be
desirable, in order to give continuity to Indian policy, to select young
men to fill the place of Viceroy, and to extend the period of office from
five to seven, or even to ten years.
Although over-centralisation is to be avoided, a certain amount of
control from a central authority is not only unavoidable; if properly
exercised, it is most beneficial. One danger to which the local agent is

exposed is that, being ill-informed of circumstances lying outside his
range of political vision, he may lose sight of the general principles
which guide the policy of the Empire; he may treat subjects of local
interest in a manner calculated to damage, or even to jeopardise,
Imperial interests. The central authority is in a position to obviate any
danger arising from this cause. To ensure the harmonious working of
the different parts of the machine, the central authority should
endeavour, so far as is possible, to realise the circumstances attendant
on the government of the dependency; whilst the local agent should be
constantly on the watch lest he should overrate the importance of some
local issue, or fail to appreciate fully the difficulties which beset the
action of the central authority.
To sum up all that there is to be said on this branch of the subject,