Political Ideals | Page 6

less violent. This is the state of affairs at present in international relations,
owing to the fact that no international government exists. The results of anarchy between
states should suffice to persuade us that anarchism has no solution to offer for the evils of
the world.
There is probably one purpose, and only one, for which the use of force by a government
is beneficent, and that is to diminish the total amount of force used m the world. It is clear,
for example, that the legal prohibition of murder diminishes the total amount of violence
in the world. And no one would maintain that parents should have unlimited freedom to
ill-treat their children. So long as some men wish to do violence to others, there cannot be
complete liberty, for either the wish to do violence must be restrained, or the victims
must be left to suffer. For this reason, although individuals and societies should have the
utmost freedom as regards their own affairs, they ought not to have complete freedom as
regards their dealings with others. To give freedom to the strong to oppress the weak is
not the way to secure the greatest possible amount of freedom in the world. This is the
basis of the socialist revolt against the kind of freedom which used to be advocated by
laissez-faire economists.
Democracy is a device--the best so far invented--for diminishing as much as possible the
interference of governments with liberty. If a nation is divided into two sections which
cannot both have their way, democracy theoretically insures that the majority shall have
their way. But democracy is not at all an adequate device unless it is accompanied by a
very great amount of devolution. Love of uniformity, or the mere pleasure of interfering,
or dislike of differing tastes and temperaments, may often lead a majority to control a
minority in matters which do not really concern the majority. We should none of us like
to have the internal affairs of Great Britain settled by a parliament of the world, if ever
such a body came into existence. Nevertheless, there are matters which such a body could
settle much better than any existing instrument of government.

The theory of the legitimate use of force in human affairs, where a government exists,
seems clear. Force should only be used against those who attempt to use force against
others, or against those who will not respect the law in cases where a common decision is
necessary and a minority are opposed to the action of the majority. These seem legitimate
occasions for the use of force; and they should be legitimate occasions in international
affairs, if an international government existed. The problem of the legitimate occasions
for the use of force in the absence of a government is a different one, with which we are
not at present concerned.
Although a government must have the power to use force, and may on occasion use it
legitimately, the aim of the reformers to have such institutions as will diminish the need
for actual coercion will be found to have this effect. Most of us abstain, for instance, from
theft, not because it is illegal, but because we feel no desire to steal. The more men learn
to live creatively rather than possessively, the less their wishes will lead them to thwart
others or to attempt violent interference with their liberty. Most of the conflicts of
interests, which lead individuals or organizations into disputes, are purely imaginary, and
would be seen to be so if men aimed more at the goods in which all can share, and less at
those private possessions that are the source of strife. In proportion as men live creatively,
they cease to wish to interfere with others by force. Very many matters in which, at
present, common action is thought indispensable, might well be left to individual decision.
It used to be thought absolutely necessary that all the inhabitants of a country should have
the same religion, but we now know that there is no such necessity. In like manner it will
be found, as men grow more tolerant in their instincts, that many uniformities now
insisted upon are useless and even harmful.
Good political institutions would weaken the impulse toward force and domination in two
ways: first, by increasing the opportunities for the creative impulses, and by shaping
education so as to strengthen these impulses; secondly, by diminishing the outlets for the
possessive instincts. The diffusion of power, both in the political and the economic
sphere, instead of its concentration in the hands of officials and captains of industry,
would greatly diminish the opportunities for acquiring the habit of command, out of
which the desire for exercising tyranny is apt to spring. Autonomy, both for districts and