Philosophy and Religion | Page 3

. 12
4. But Matter certainly does not exist merely for our transitory and incomplete knowledge: if it cannot exist apart from Mind, there must be a universal Mind in which and for which all things exist, i.e. God, . . . . . . . 16
5. But Theism is possible without Idealism. The impossibility of Materialism has generally been recognized (e.g. by Spinoza, Spencer, Haeckel). If the ultimate Reality is not Matter, it must be utterly unlike anything we know, or be Mind. The latter view more probable, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. It is more reasonable to explain the lower by the higher than vice versa, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
LECTURE II
THE UNIVERSAL CAUSE, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. We have been led by the idealistic argument to recognize the necessity of a Mind which thinks the world. Insufficiency of this view.
{xiii}
2. In our experiences of external Nature we meet with nothing but succession, never with Causality. The Uniformity of Nature is a postulate of Physical Science, not a necessity of thought. The idea of Causality derived from our consciousness of Volition. Causality=Activity, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3. If events must have a cause, and we know of no cause but Will, it is reasonable to infer that the events which we do not cause must be caused by some other Will; and the systematic unity of Nature implies that this cause must be One Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4. Moreover, the analogy of the human mind suggests the probability that, if God is Mind, there must be in Him, as in us, the three activities of Thought, Feeling, and Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5. The above line of argument can be used by the Realist who believes matter to be a thing-in-itself; but it fits in much better with the Idealistic view of the relations between mind and matter, and with the tendency of modern physics to resolve matter into Force, . 48
6. Testimony of Spencer and Kant to the theory that the Ultimate Reality is Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7. Is God a Person? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
LECTURE III
GOD AND THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1. The empirical study of Nature ('red in tooth and claw') can tell us of purpose, not what the purpose is. The only source of knowledge of the character of God is to be found in the moral Consciousness.
2. Our moral judgements are as valid as other judgements (e.g. mathematical axioms), and equally reveal the thought of God, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3. This does not imply that the moral consciousness is not gradually evolved, or that each individual's conscience is infallible, or that our moral judgements in detail are as certain as mathematical judgements, or that the detailed rules of human conduct are applicable to God, . . 63
{xiv}
4. Corollaries:
(a) Belief in the objectivity of our moral judgements logically implies belief in God, . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (b) If God aims at an end not fully realized here, we have a ground for postulating Immortality, . . . . . . 77 (c) Evil must be a necessary means to greater good, . . 79
5. In what sense this 'limits God.' Omnipotence=ability to do all things which are in their own nature possible, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
LECTURE IV
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
1. Is the world created? There may or may not be a beginning of the particular series of physical events constituting our world. But, even if this series has a beginning, this implies some previous existence which has no beginning.
2. Is the whole-time series infinite? Time must be regarded as objective, but the 'antinomies' involved in the nature of Time