Phaedo | Page 4

life, for that is held to be unlawful.'
Cebes asks why suicide is thought not to be right, if death is to be
accounted a good? Well, (1) according to one explanation, because man
is a prisoner, who must not open the door of his prison and run
away--this is the truth in a 'mystery.' Or (2) rather, because he is not his
own property, but a possession of the gods, and has no right to make
away with that which does not belong to him. But why, asks Cebes, if
he is a possession of the gods, should he wish to die and leave them?
For he is under their protection; and surely he cannot take better care of
himself than they take of him. Simmias explains that Cebes is really
referring to Socrates, whom they think too unmoved at the prospect of
leaving the gods and his friends. Socrates answers that he is going to

other gods who are wise and good, and perhaps to better friends; and he
professes that he is ready to defend himself against the charge of Cebes.
The company shall be his judges, and he hopes that he will be more
successful in convincing them than he had been in convincing the
court.
The philosopher desires death--which the wicked world will insinuate
that he also deserves: and perhaps he does, but not in any sense which
they are capable of understanding. Enough of them: the real question is,
What is the nature of that death which he desires? Death is the
separation of soul and body--and the philosopher desires such a
separation. He would like to be freed from the dominion of bodily
pleasures and of the senses, which are always perturbing his mental
vision. He wants to get rid of eyes and ears, and with the light of the
mind only to behold the light of truth. All the evils and impurities and
necessities of men come from the body. And death separates him from
these corruptions, which in life he cannot wholly lay aside. Why then
should he repine when the hour of separation arrives? Why, if he is
dead while he lives, should he fear that other death, through which
alone he can behold wisdom in her purity?
Besides, the philosopher has notions of good and evil unlike those of
other men. For they are courageous because they are afraid of greater
dangers, and temperate because they desire greater pleasures. But he
disdains this balancing of pleasures and pains, which is the exchange of
commerce and not of virtue. All the virtues, including wisdom, are
regarded by him only as purifications of the soul. And this was the
meaning of the founders of the mysteries when they said, 'Many are the
wand-bearers but few are the mystics.' (Compare Matt. xxii.: 'Many are
called but few are chosen.') And in the hope that he is one of these
mystics, Socrates is now departing. This is his answer to any one who
charges him with indifference at the prospect of leaving the gods and
his friends.
Still, a fear is expressed that the soul upon leaving the body may vanish
away like smoke or air. Socrates in answer appeals first of all to the old
Orphic tradition that the souls of the dead are in the world below, and
that the living come from them. This he attempts to found on a
philosophical assumption that all opposites--e.g. less, greater; weaker,
stronger; sleeping, waking; life, death--are generated out of each other.

Nor can the process of generation be only a passage from living to
dying, for then all would end in death. The perpetual sleeper
(Endymion) would be no longer distinguished from the rest of mankind.
The circle of nature is not complete unless the living come from the
dead as well as pass to them.
The Platonic doctrine of reminiscence is then adduced as a
confirmation of the pre-existence of the soul. Some proofs of this
doctrine are demanded. One proof given is the same as that of the
Meno, and is derived from the latent knowledge of mathematics, which
may be elicited from an unlearned person when a diagram is presented
to him. Again, there is a power of association, which from seeing
Simmias may remember Cebes, or from seeing a picture of Simmias
may remember Simmias. The lyre may recall the player of the lyre, and
equal pieces of wood or stone may be associated with the higher notion
of absolute equality. But here observe that material equalities fall short
of the conception of absolute equality with which they are compared,
and which is the measure of them. And the measure or standard must
be prior to that which is measured, the idea of equality prior to the
visible equals. And if