Personal Memoirs of General U.S. Grant, vol 2 | Page 6

would retreat, and
advising peremptory orders against his doing so.
As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the
government the propriety of a movement against Mobile. General
Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large and
well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg
confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering
it was on the defensive. But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's
army was largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who
was being reinforced to raise the siege. I frequently wrote General
Halleck suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so
doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay
Chattanooga open to capture. General Halleck strongly approved the
suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered
Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to
comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war,
had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two
decisive battles at the same time." If true, the maxim was not applicable
in this case. It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles
fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. I, however,
was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn from

Rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were
much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over,
when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered to move
against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. Finally he
did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards Vicksburg
surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to return.
It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the
movement against Mobile. I knew the peril the Army of the
Cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary
casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly
extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front
was as constantly being strengthened. Mobile was important to the
enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little
else than artillery. If threatened by land and from the water at the same
time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its
defence. Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg. My
judgment was overruled, and the troops under my command were
dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they
could render the most service.
Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble
and required assistance. The emergency was now too immediate to
allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg
upon Mobile. It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and
troops were sent from every available point.
Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee
River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and
intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right
and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. But he
pushed on, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops
from Mississippi began to join him. Then Bragg took the initiative.
Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army
together at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before
the main battle was brought on. The battle was fought on the 19th and
20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy

loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and
captured. The corps under Major-General George H. Thomas stood its
ground, while Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to
Chattanooga. Thomas returned also, but later, and with his troops in
good order. Bragg followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge,
overlooking Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of
the town, which Rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of
the river and the river road as far back as Bridgeport. The National
troops were now strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the
Tennessee River behind them and the enemy occupying commanding
heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from
mountain to mountain, and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large part of
the way, in front of their line.
On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all
the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to
Rosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his
way, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison of