Pascals Pensees | Page 7

[C] For a brilliant criticism of the errors of Descartes from a theological
point of view the reader is referred to Three Reformers by Jacques
Maritain (translation published by Sheed & Ward).
He who reads this book will observe at once its fragmentary nature; but
only after some study will perceive that the fragmentariness lies in the

expression more than in the thought. The "thoughts" cannot be
detached from each other and quoted as if each were complete in itself.
Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point: how often one
has heard that quoted, and quoted often to the wrong purpose! For this
is by no means an exaltation of the "heart" over the "head," a defence
of unreason. The heart, in Pascal's terminology, is itself truly rational if
it is truly the heart. For him, in theological matters, which seemed to
him much larger, more difficult, and more important than scientific
matters, the whole personality is involved.
We cannot quite understand any of the parts, fragmentary as they are,
without some understanding of the whole. Capital, for instance, is his
analysis of the three orders: the order of nature, the order of mind, and
the order of charity. These three are discontinuous; the higher is not
implicit in the lower as in an evolutionary doctrine it would be.[D] In
this distinction Pascal offers much about which the modern world
would do well to think. And indeed, because of his unique combination
and balance of qualities, I know of no religious writer more pertinent to
our time. The great mystics like St. John of the Cross, are primarily for
readers with a special determination of purpose; the devotional writers,
such as St. François de Sales, are primarily for those who already feel
consciously desirous of the love of God; the great theologians are for
those interested in theology. But I can think of no Christian writer, not
Newman even, more to be commended than Pascal to those who doubt,
but who have the mind to conceive, and the sensibility to feel, the
disorder, the futility, the meaninglessness, the mystery of life and
suffering, and who can only find peace through a satisfaction of the
whole being.
[D] An important modern theory of discontinuity, suggested partly by
Pascal, is sketched in the collected fragments of Speculations by T. E.
Hulme (Kegan Paul).
T. S. ELIOT.

CONTENTS

Page INTRODUCTION By T. S. Eliot vii SECTION I. THOUGHTS
ON MIND AND ON STYLE 1 II. THE MISERY OF MAN
WITHOUT GOD 14 III. OF THE NECESSITY OF THE WAGER 52
IV. OF THE MEANS OF BELIEF 71 V. JUSTICE AND THE
REASON OF EFFECTS 83 VI. THE PHILOSOPHERS 96 VII.
MORALITY AND DOCTRINE 113 VIII. THE FUNDAMENTALS
OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 152 IX. PERPETUITY 163 X.
TYPOLOGY 181 XI. THE PROPHECIES 198 XII. PROOFS OF
JESUS CHRIST 222 XIII. THE MIRACLES 238 XIV. APPENDIX:
POLEMICAL FRAGMENTS 257 NOTES 273 INDEX 289
* * * * *
NOTE
Passages erased by Pascal are enclosed in square brackets, thus [].
Words, added or corrected by the editor of the text, are similarly
denoted, but are in italics.
It has been seen fit to transfer Fragment 514 of the French edition to the
Notes. All subsequent Fragments have accordingly been renumbered.

SECTION I
THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE
1
The difference between the mathematical and the intuitive mind.[1]--In
the one the principles are palpable, but removed from ordinary use; so
that for want of habit it is difficult to turn one's mind in that direction:
but if one turns it thither ever so little, one sees the principles fully, and
one must have a quite inaccurate mind who reasons wrongly from
principles so plain that it is almost impossible they should escape
notice.
But in the intuitive mind the principles are found in common use, and

are before the eyes of everybody. One has only to look, and no effort is
necessary; it is only a question of good eyesight, but it must be good,
for the principles are so subtle and so numerous, that it is almost
impossible but that some escape notice. Now the omission of one
principle leads to error; thus one must have very clear sight to see all
the principles, and in the next place an accurate mind not to draw false
deductions from known principles.
All mathematicians would then be intuitive if they had clear sight, for
they do not reason incorrectly from principles known to them; and
intuitive minds would be mathematical if they could turn their eyes to
the principles of mathematics to which they are unused.
The reason, therefore, that some intuitive minds are not mathematical is
that they cannot at all turn their attention to the principles of
mathematics. But the reason