On Compromise | Page 2

be pressed too far
Our action in realising our opinions depends on our social theory Legitimate and
illegitimate compromise in view of that The distinction equally sound on the evolutional
theory Condition of progressive change A plea for compromise examined A second plea
The allegation of provisional usefulness examined Illustrated in religious institutions In
political institutions Burke's commendation of political compromise The saying that
small reforms may be the worst enemies of great ones In what sense true Illustration in
the Elementary Education Act Wisdom of social patience The considerations which apply
to political practice do not apply to our own lives Nor to the publication of social
opinions The amount of conscience in a community Evil of attenuating this element

Historic illustration New side of the discussion Is earnestness of conviction fatal to
concession of liberty to others? Two propositions at the base of an affirmative answer
Earnestness of conviction consistent with sense of liability to error Belief in one's own
infallibility does not necessarily lead to intolerance The contrary notion due to juristic
analogies in social discussion Connection between the doctrine of liberty and social
evolution The timid compromisers superfluous apprehension Material limits to the effect
of moral speculation Illustration from the history of Slavery Illustration from French
history Practical influence of a faith in the self-protecting quality of a society Conclusion
NOTE TO PAGE 242.
The Doctrine of Liberty

ON COMPROMISE.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY.
The design of the following essay is to consider, in a short and direct way, some of the
limits that are set by sound reason to the practice of the various arts of accommodation,
economy, management, conformity, or compromise. The right of thinking freely and
acting independently, of using our minds without excessive awe of authority, and shaping
our lives without unquestioning obedience to custom, is now a finally accepted principle
in some sense or other with every school of thought that has the smallest chance of
commanding the future. Under what circumstances does the exercise and vindication of
the right, thus conceded in theory, become a positive duty in practice? If the majority are
bound to tolerate dissent from the ruling opinions and beliefs, under what conditions and
within what limitations is the dissentient imperatively bound to avail himself of this
toleration? How far, and in what way, ought respect either for immediate practical
convenience, or for current prejudices, to weigh against respect for truth? For how much
is it well that the individual should allow the feelings and convictions of the many to
count, when he comes to shape, to express, and to act upon his own feelings and
convictions? Are we only to be permitted to defend general principles, on condition that
we draw no practical inferences from them? Is every other idea to yield precedence and
empire to existing circumstances, and is the immediate and universal workableness of a
policy to be the main test of its intrinsic fitness?
To attempt to answer all these questions fully would be nothing less than to attempt a
compendium of life and duty in all their details, a Summa of cases of conscience, a guide
to doubters at every point of the compass. The aim of the present writer is a
comparatively modest one; namely, to seek one or two of the most general principles
which ought to regulate the practice of compliance, and to suggest some of the bearings
which they may have in their application to certain difficulties in modern matters of
conduct.

It is pretty plain that an inquiry of this kind needs to be fixed by reference to a given set
of social circumstances tolerably well understood. There are some common rules as to the
expediency of compromise and conformity, but their application is a matter of endless
variety and the widest elasticity. The interesting and useful thing is to find the relation of
these too vague rules to actual conditions; to transform them into practical guides and real
interpreters of what is right and best in thought and conduct, in a special and definite kind
of emergency. According to the current assumptions of the writer and the preacher, the
one commanding law is that men should cling to truth and right, if the very heavens fall.
In principle this is universally accepted. To the partisans of authority and tradition it is as
much a commonplace as to the partisans of the most absolute and unflinching rationalism.
Yet in practice all schools alike are forced to admit the necessity of a measure of
accommodation in the very interests of truth itself. Fanatic is a name of such ill repute,
exactly because one who deserves to be called by it injures good causes by refusing
timely and harmless concession; by irritating prejudices that a wiser way of urging his
own