On Commando | Page 8

for an
eventual storming.
The whole of that day and the two succeeding days there was a constant
salvo over our heads. The bullets flew over our heads like finches, and
did us no harm, but we had to be on our guard against the sharpshooters,
who occasionally fired close to us. That day (January 24), the heroic
Battle of Spion Kop took place, where our burghers, after having been
surprised in the night by the enemy and driven off the kop, obliged
them, after a stubborn fight, to abandon it again. The Pretoria men, who
were to have relieved us in the trench, took a great part in that battle.
Reineke, Yeppe, Malherbe, De Villiers, and Olivier were killed. Ihrige
was severely wounded.
All day long we lay listening to the fighting, for we could not sleep. We
had to stay in the trench three days and four nights before we were
relieved. Water and food were brought to us, or fetched by our men at
night, as we did not venture to leave the trench by day. We were safe

enough, for the bombs had not much effect on the sand-walls of our
trench, and there was always time to stoop to avoid them. The
following morning news was brought to us that the enemy had
abandoned the whole line of battle and were retreating in the direction
of Chieveley.
The battle of the Tugela had lasted eight days.
I had again hurt my knee, and had to leave Ladysmith for Pretoria, from
whence I went to Warmbad at Waterberg to stay for a few weeks with
Mrs. Klein-Frikkie Grobler, who received me most kindly. My brother
Frits got leave for the first time then, too, and Willem remained at
Ladysmith. During my absence the English broke through at Pieter's
Heights, where Willem was made prisoner and Lüttig, Malherbe and
Stuart de Villiers were killed. Meanwhile Frits had gone, with some
other Pretoria men, to the Orange Free State, where the enemy had
surrounded General Cronje.
Since the beginning of the siege our burghers always thought the town
would fall soon. 'The khakies cannot hold out any longer! They have no
provisions, and their ammunition must be coming to an end! Buller can
never cross the Tugela, our positions are too good! What does it matter
if I do go on leave? The khakies cannot get through!' That was the
opinion of most of the burghers. And if anyone ventured to point out
that the enemy might force their way through because we did not all do
our duty, he was either not believed or looked upon as a traitor.
Meanwhile enthusiasm was dying out. The burghers lay in their lagers
or went home, trusting to the few willing ones, who ultimately proved
not strong enough to withstand the overwhelming force that Buller
brought to bear upon one point of our positions when he was obliged to
force his way through at no matter what cost.
No leave should have been given during the war, and here I may as
well mention--although this tale does not pretend to be a history of the
war--that it has been carried on with far too great laxity, owing to the
ignorance of our Generals and the demoralizing influence of
self-interest and nepotism. We should have sent our forces far into the
Cape Colony to get help from our brothers in a war that had been
forced upon us by England. The Colonial Afrikanders never had the
opportunity of standing by us, because we did not supply them with the
necessary ammunition or stretch out our hands towards them. Unless

they had help from our invading forces, they dared not risk a rising,
because of the confiscation of their property in case of failure.
We have had to suffer--to suffer cruelly for our sins. Our enemy forced
his way through the dyke that surrounded us, and like a stormy sea he
ruined our homes, devastated our fields, and caused us endless
suffering. Besides this, the talk of intervention had an enervating
effecton the commandos. In our commando, which was largely
composed of ignorant men, the strangest stories went round. One was
that the Russians had landed somewhere in South Africa with 100
cannon. There was always talk of a great European War having broken
out; and the consequence was that the Boers counted on intervention or
help from the Powers, instead of depending on their own strength and
perseverance. The most sensible among us recognised the
improbability of intervention. It was not to the interest of any foreign
Power to intervene in South Africa where it had no firm footing,
particularly as Chamberlain had, by most cunning artifices, forced us to
be the aggressors.
War was inevitable. Sooner or later it had to come.