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of the COMMON interests, in
lieu of those of a monarch. There is no common principle of popular
sway recognized in the Constitution. In the government of the several
States monarchy is denounced, but democracy is nowhere proclaimed
or insisted on. Marked differences in the degrees of popular control
existed in the country in 1789; and though time is lessening them, are
still to be found among us.

The close consideration of all these facts, we feel persuaded will give a
coloring to some of the most important interests of the country,
differing essentially from those that have been loosely adopted in the
conflicts of parties, and many heresies appear to us to have crept into
the political creed of the Republic, purely from the struggles of faction.
When men have a specific and important purpose in view, it is but
natural they should bend most of its collateral connections to the
support of their own objects. We conceive that the Constitution has
thus been largely misinterpreted, and they who live at the epoch of the
renowned "equilibrium" and of the "rights of the people of the
Sovereign States," will have seen memorable examples of the truth of
this position.
The first popular error, then, that we shall venture to assail, is that
connected with the prevalent notion of the sovereignty of the States.
We do not believe that the several States of this Union are, in any
legitimate meaning of the term, sovereign at all. We are fully aware
that this will be regarded as a bold, and possibly as a presuming
proposition, but we shall endeavor to work it out with such means as
we may have at command.
We lay down the following premises as too indisputable to need any
arguments to sustain them: viz., the authority which formed the present
Constitution of the United States had the legal power to do so. That
authority was in the Government of the States, respectively, and not in
their people in the popular signification, but through their people in the
political meaning of the term, and what was then done must be
regarded as acts connected with the composition and nature of
governments, and of no minor or different interests of human affairs.
It being admitted, that the power which formed the government, was
legitimate, we obtain one of the purest compacts for the organization of
human society that probably ever existed. The ancient allegiance, under
which the Colonies had grown up to importance, had been extinguished
by solemn treaty, and the States met in Convention, sustained by all the
law they had and backed in every instance by institutions that were
more or less popular. The history of the world cannot, probably, furnish

another instance of the settlement of the fundamental compact of a
great nation under circumstances of so much obvious justice. This
gives unusual solemnity and authority to the Constitution of 1787, and
invests it with additional claims to our admiration and respect.
The authority which formed the Constitution admitted, we come next to
the examination of its acts. It is apparent from the debates and
proceedings of the Convention, that two opinions existed in that body;
the one leaning strongly toward the concentration of power in the hands
of the Federal Government, and the other desirous of leaving as much
as possible with the respective States. The principle that the powers
which are not directly conceded to the Union should remain in first
hands, would seem never to have been denied; and some years after the
organization of the Government, it was solemnly recognized in an
amendment. We are not disposed, however, to look for arguments to
the debates and discussions of the Convention, in our view often a
deceptive and dangerous method of construing a law, since the vote is
very frequently given on even conflicting reasons. Different minds
arrive at the same results by different processes; and it is no unusual
thing for men to deny each other's premises while they accept their
conclusions. We shall look, therefore, solely to the compact itself, as
the most certain mode of ascertaining what was done.
No one will deny that all the great powers of sovereignty are directly
conceded to the Union. The right to make war and peace, to coin
money, maintain armies and navies, &c., &c., in themselves
overshadow most of the sovereignty of the States. The amendatory
clause would seem to annihilate it. By the provisions of that clause
three fourths of the States can take away all the powers and rights now
resting in the hands of the respective States, with a single exception.
This exception gives breadth and emphasis to the efficiency of the
clause. It will be remembered that all this can be done within the
present Constitution. It is a