Neutral Rights and Obligations in the Anglo-Boer War | Page 2

Department in the case of Mr. John Hays Hammond, a citizen of the United States who had been involved in the Jameson Raid, although he had taken part in an expedition which was not officially approved by Great Britain and which was hostile to a Government with which the United States had no quarrel.[1]
[Footnote 1: For. Rel., 1896, pp. 562-581.]
On October 8, the day before the Transvaal ultimatum was presented to Great Britain, the British Ambassador in Washington confidentially inquired whether in the event of an attack upon the English forces by the Boers, rendering necessary the withdrawal of the British agent, the United States would allow its consul to take charge of the British interests in the Transvaal.[2] Consent was very properly given on the eleventh that the United States would gladly allow its consul at Pretoria "to afford to British interests in that quarter friendly and neutral protective offices."[3] On the thirteenth this courtesy was acknowledged and the information given that the British agent had withdrawn. On the same day Mr. McCrum was instructed, "with the assent of the South African Republic, to afford to British interests the friendly protective offices usual in such contingencies."[4]
[Footnote 2: For. Rel., 1899, p. 350, Tower to Hay, Oct. 8, 1899.]
[Footnote 3: For. Rel., 1899, P. 350, Hill to Tower, Oct. 11, 1899.]
[Footnote 4: For. Rel., 1899, p. 351, Tower to Hill, and Adee to Tower, Oct. 13, 1899.]
Having thus assumed an attitude entirely in accord with the obligations incumbent upon a neutral, the United States refused to heed the popular demand to urge upon Great Britain its offices as mediator in a matter which directly concerned the British colonial policy. Secretary Hay properly refused to involve the Administration in the complications which would have followed any official interrogation addressed to the British Government with reference to its ultimate intentions in South Africa. Moreover, it was authoritatively stated that any concerted European intervention would not meet with favor in Washington, as such action would only tend to disturb general commercial relations by embroiling most of the nations of the world. Any attempted intervention would certainly have led to a conflict of the Powers, and would have involved questions of national supremacy, disturbed the balance of power, and raised the Chinese question, in which last the United States had an important interest. It was a sound policy therefore upon the part of the United States not to encourage any intervention by European nations in the affairs of Great Britain in South Africa.
This attitude not only reciprocated the friendly feeling shown by England during the Spanish-American War, but was in strict accord with the traditional American policy enunciated by Washington. The acquisition of the Philippines had only served to exemplify the soundness of this doctrine, and the State Department was not in a mood to take the initial steps which might lead to added responsibilities with reference to matters which, in this instance at any rate, were not directly of American concern. The part to be played by the United States was clearly that of an impartial neutral.
In his message to Congress in 1900 President McKinley stated that he was happy to say that abundant opportunity had been afforded in the situation at Pretoria to permit the United States consul there to show the impartiality of the Government toward both the combatants. Developments, however, were to show that things had not gone so smoothly there as was supposed at the time.
On December 8 the President had appointed Mr. Adelbert Hay, son of the Secretary of State, to succeed Mr. McCrum in his position as consul and instructions were sent to him to proceed at once to Pretoria. Mr. Hollis, the American consul at Lorenzo Marques, was directed at the same time to act ad interim at Pretoria after the departure of Mr. McCrum and until Mr. Hay could reach South Africa. On December 18 Mr. Hollis took charge of all British and American interests within the Transvaal while still keeping an oversight of the affairs of the United States in and around Lorenzo Marques.
Soon after the war had begun Mr. McCrum had reported to Washington, in reply to inquiries with reference to the British prisoners in the hands of the Boers, that it was the wish of the Republican Government that in the future all requests for the payment of money to officers or other prisoners, as well as inquiries regarding their welfare, should come through the regular military channels at the front. The Republic at the same time intimated that it could no longer recognize Mr. McCrum in any official capacity on behalf of Great Britain.[5] The British representative at once suggested that the United States consul be instructed to point out to the Transvaal that such an attitude was a departure from