Natural Law in the Spiritual World | Page 8

absolute existence than parallels of
latitude. But they exist for us. They are drawn for us to understand the
part by some Hand that drew the whole; so drawn, perhaps, that,
understanding the part, we too in time may learn to understand the
whole. Now the inquiry we propose to ourselves resolves itself into the
simple question, Do these lines stop with what we call the Natural
sphere? Is it not possible that they may lead further? Is it probable that
the Hand which ruled them gave up the work where most of all they
were required? Did that Hand divide the world into two, a cosmos and
a chaos, the higher being the chaos? With Nature as the symbol of all of
harmony and beauty that is known to man, must we still talk of the
super-natural, not as a convenient word, but as a different order of
world, an unintelligible world, where the Reign of Mystery supersedes
the Reign of Law?
This question, let it be carefully observed, applies to Laws not to
Phenomena. That the Phenomena of the Spiritual World are in analogy
with the Phenomena of the Natural World requires no restatement.
Since Plato enunciated his doctrine of the Cave or of the twice-divided
line; since Christ spake in parables; since Plotinus wrote of the world as
an image; since the mysticism of Swedenborg; since Bacon and Pascal;
since "Sartor Resartus" and "In Memoriam," it has been all but a
commonplace with thinkers that "the invisible things of God from the
creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things
that are made." Milton's question--
"What if earth Be but the shadow of heaven, and things therein Each to
other like more than on earth is thought?"
is now superfluous. "In our doctrine of representations and
correspondences," says Swedenborg, "we shall treat of both these
symbolical and typical resemblances, and of the astonishing things that

occur, I will not say in the living body only, but throughout Nature, and
which correspond so entirely to supreme and spiritual things, that one
would swear that the physical world was purely symbolical of the
spiritual world."[4] And Carlyle: "All visible things are emblems. What
thou seest is not there on its own account; strictly speaking is not there
at all. Matter exists only spiritually, and to represent some idea and
body it forth."[5]
But the analogies of Law are a totally different thing from the analogies
of Phenomena and have a very different value. To say generally, with
Pascal, that--"La nature est une image de la grace," is merely to be
poetical. The function of Hervey's "Meditations in a Flower Garden,"
or, Flavel's "Husbandry Spiritualized," is mainly homiletical. That such
works have an interest is not to be denied. The place of parable in
teaching, and especially after the sanction of the greatest of Teachers,
must always be recognized. The very necessities of language indeed
demand this method of presenting truth. The temporal is the husk and
framework of the eternal, and thoughts can be uttered only through
things.[6]
But analogies between Phenomena bear the same relation to analogies
of Law that Phenomena themselves bear to Law. The light of Law on
truth, as we have seen, is an immense advance upon the light of
Phenomena. The discovery of Law is simply the discovery of Science.
And if the analogies of Natural Law can be extended to the Spiritual
World, that whole region at once falls within the domain of science and
secures a basis as well as an illumination in the constitution and course
of Nature. All, therefore, that has been claimed for parable can be
predicated a fortiori of this--with the addition that a proof on the basis
of Law would want no criterion possessed by the most advanced
science.
That the validity of analogy generally has been seriously questioned
one must frankly own. Doubtless there is much difficulty and even
liability to gross error in attempting to establish analogy in specific
cases. The value of the likeness appears differently to different minds,
and in discussing an individual instance questions of relevancy will

invariably crop up. Of course, in the language of John Stuart Mill,
"when the analogy can be proved, the argument founded upon it cannot
be resisted."[7] But so great is the difficulty of proof that many are
compelled to attach the most inferior weight to analogy as a method of
reasoning. "Analogical evidence is generally more successful in
silencing objections than in evincing truth. Though it rarely refutes it
frequently repels refutation; like those weapons which though they
cannot kill the enemy, will ward his blows.... It must be allowed that
analogical evidence is at least but a feeble support, and is hardly ever
honored with the name of proof."[8] Other authorities on