and Society. His Ethical Standard
indistinctly expressed. Resolved Virtue into Knowledge. Ideal of
pursuit--Well-doing. Inculcated self-denying Precepts. Political Theory.
Connexion of Ethics with Theology slender.
PLATO. Review of the Dialogues containing portions of Ethical
Theory:--Alkibiades I. discusses Just and Unjust. Alkibiades II. the
knowledge of Good or Reason. Hippias Minor identifies Virtue with
Knowledge. Minos (on Law) refers everything to the decision of an
Ideal Wise man. Laekes resolves Courage, and Charmides Temperance,
into Intelligence or the supreme science of good and evil. Lysis (on
Friendship) gives the Idea of the good as the supreme object of
affection. Menon enquires, Is virtue _teachable?_ and iterates the
science of good and evil. Protagoras makes Pleasure the only good,
and Pain the only evil, and defines the science of good and evil as the
comparison of pleasures and pains. Gorgias contradicts Protagoras, and
sets up Order or Discipline as a final end. Politikus (on Government)
repeats the Sokratic ideal of the One Wise man. Philebus makes Good a
compound of Pleasure with Intelligence, the last predominating. The
Republic assimilates Society to an Individual man, and defines Justice
as the balance of the constituent parts of each. Timoeus repeats the
doctrine that wickedness is disease, and not voluntary. The Laws place
all conduct under the prescription of the civil magistrate. Summary of
Plato's views.
THE CYNICS AND THE CYRENAICS. Cynic succession. The proper
description of the tenets of both schools comes under the Summum
Bonum. The Cynic Ideal was the minimum of wants, and their
self-denial was compensated by exemption from fear, and by pride of
superiority. The Cyrenaic ARISTIPPUS:--Was the first to maintain that
the summum bonum is Pleasure and the absence of Pain. Future
Pleasures and Pains taken into the account. His Psychology of Pleasure
and Pain.
ARISTOTLE. Abstract of the Nicomachean Ethics. Book First. The
Chief Good, or Highest End of human endeavours. Great differences of
opinion as to the nature of Happiness. The Platonic Idea of the Good
criticised. The Highest End an _end-in-itself_. Virtue referable to the
special work of man; growing out of his mental capacity. External
conditions necessary to virtue and happiness. The Soul subdivided into
parts, each, having its characteristic virtue or excellence.
Book Second. Definition and classification of the Moral virtues. Virtue
the result of Habit. Doctrine of the MEAN. The test of virtue to feel no
pain. Virtue defined (_genus_) an acquirement or a State, (_differentia_)
a Mean between extremes. Rules for hitting the Mean.
Book Third. The Voluntary and Involuntary. Deliberate Preference.
Virtue and vice are voluntary. The virtues in detail:--Courage
[Self-sacrifice implied in Courage]. Temperance.
Book Fourth. Liberality. Magnificence. Magnanimity. Mildness.
Good-breeding. Modesty.
Book Fifth. Justice:--Universal Justice includes all virtue. Particular
Justice is of two kinds, Distributive and Corrective.
Book Sixth. Intellectual Excellences, or Virtues of the Intellect. The
Rational part of the Soul embraces the Scientific and the Deliberative
functions. Science deals with the necessary. Prudence or the Practical
Reason; its aims and requisites. In virtue, good dispositions must be
accompanied with Prudence.
Book Seventh. Gradations of moral strength and moral weakness.
Continence and Incontinence.
Books Eighth and Ninth. Friendship:--Grounds of Friendship. Varieties
of Friendship, corresponding to different objects of liking. Friendship
between the virtuous is alone perfect. A settled habit, not a mere
passion. Equality in friendship. Political friendships. Explanation of the
family affections. Rule of reciprocity of services. Conflicting
obligations. Cessation of friendships. Goodwill. Love felt by
benefactors. Self-love. Does the happy man need friends?
Book Tenth. Pleasure:--Theories of Pleasure--Eudoxus, Speusippus,
Plato. Pleasure is not The Good. Pleasure defined. The pleasures of
Intellect. Nature of the Good or Happiness resumed. Perfect happiness
found only in the philosophical life; second to which is the active social
life of the good citizen. Happiness of the gods. Transition from Ethics
to Politics.
THE STOICS. The succession of Stoical philosophers. Theological
Doctrines of the Stoics:--The Divine Government; human beings must
rise to the comprehension of Universal Law; the soul at death absorbed
into the divine essence; argument from Design. Psychology:--Theory of
Pleasure and Pain; theory of the Will. Doctrine of Happiness or the
Good:--Pain no evil; discipline of endurance--Apathy. Theory of
Virtue:--Subordination of self to the larger interests; their view of
active Beneficence; the Stoical paradoxes; the idea of Duty;
consciousness of Self-improvement.
EPICURUS. Life and writings. His successors. Virtue and vice referred
by him to Pleasures and Pains calculated by Reason. Freedom from
Pain the primary object. Regulation of desires. Pleasure good if not
leading to pain. Bodily feeling the foundation of sensibility. Mental
feelings contain memory and hope. The greatest miseries are from the
delusions of hope, and from the torments of fear. Fear of Death and
Fear of the Gods. Relations with others; Justice and Friendship--both
based on reciprocity. Virtue and Happiness inseparable. Epicureanism
the type of all systems grounded on
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