Moral Philosophy | Page 2

threaten, nor talk of duty, law, or punishment.
Ethics, thus strictly considered on an Aristotelian basis, are antecedent to Natural Theology. They belong rather to Natural Anthropology: they are a study of human nature. But as human nature points to God, so Ethics are not wholly irrespective of God, considering Him as the object of human happiness and worship,--the Supreme Being without whom all the aspirations of humanity are at fault (pp. 13-26, 191-197). Ethics do not refer to the commandments of God, for this simple reason, that they have nothing to say to commandments, or laws, or obligation, or authority. They are simply a system of moral hygiene, which a man may adopt or not: only, like any other physician, the professor of Ethics utters a friendly warning that misery must ensue upon the neglect of what makes for health.
Deontology, not Ethics, expounds and vindicates the idea, I ought. It is the science of Duty. It carries the mild suasions of Ethics into laws, and out of moral prudence it creates conscience. And whereas Ethics do not deal with sin, except under the aspect of what is called "philosophical sin" (p. 119, �� 6), Deontology defines sin in its proper theological sense, as "an offence against God, or any thought, word, or deed against the law of God." Deontology therefore presupposes and is consequent upon Natural Theology. At the same time, while Ethics indicate a valuable proof of the existence of God as the requisite Object of Happiness, Deontology affords a proof of Him as the requisite Lawgiver. Without God, man's rational desire is frustrate, and man's conscience a misrepresentation of fact. [Footnote 1]
[Footnote 1: This is Cardinal Newman's proof of the existence of God from Conscience: see pp. 124, 125, and _Grammar of Assent_, pp. 104-111, ed. 1895. With Newman's, "Conscience has both a critical and a judicial office," compare Plato, _Politicus_, 260 B, [Greek: sumpasaes taes gnostikaes to men epitaktikon meros, to de kritikon]. The "critical" office belongs to Ethics: the "judicial," or "preceptive" office [Greek: to epitaktikon] to Deontology; and this latter points to a Person who commands and judges, that is, to God.]
In this volume, pp. 1-108 make up the treatise on Ethics: pp. 109-176 that on Deontology.
Aristotle writes: "He that acts by intelligence and cultivates understanding, is likely to be best disposed and dearest to God. For if, as is thought, there is any care of human things on the part of the heavenly powers, we may reasonably expect them to delight in that which is best and most akin to themselves, that is, in intelligence, and to make a return of good to such as supremely love and honour intelligence, as cultivating the thing dearest to Heaven, and so behaving rightly and well. Such, plainly, is the behaviour of the wise. The wise man therefore is the dearest to God" (Nic. Eth. X. ix. 13). But Aristotle does not work out the connexion between God and His law on the one hand and human conscience and duty on the other. In that direction the Stoics, and after them the Roman Jurists, went further than Aristotle. By reason of this deficiency, Aristotle, peerless as he is in Ethics, remains an imperfect Moral Philosopher.

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION (1918)
1. I have altered the opening pages in accordance with the Preface to the edition of 1905.
2. I have added a paragraph on Syndicalism (pp. 291-2).
3. Also a new Table of _Addenda et Corrigenda_, and a new Index.
The quotations from St. Thomas may be read in English, nearly all of them, in the Author's _Aquinas Ethicus_, 2 vols.; 12s. (Burns and Oates.)

CONTENTS.
PART I.--ETHICS.

CHAPTER I
.--OF THE OBJECT-MATTER AND PARTITION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER II
.--OF HAPPINESS. Section I.--Of Ends. Section II.--Definition of Happiness. Section III.--Happiness open to Man. Section IV.--Of the Object of Perfect Happiness. Section V.--Of the use of the present life.

CHAPTER III
.--OF HUMAN ACTS. Section I.--What makes a human act less voluntary. Section II.--Of the determinants of Morality in any given action.

CHAPTER IV
.--OF PASSIONS. Section I.--Of Passions in general. Section II.--Of Desire. Section III.--Of Delight. Section IV.--Of Anger.

CHAPTER V
.--OF HABITS AND VIRTUES. Section I.--Of Habit. Section II.--Of Virtues in general. Section III.--Of the difference between Virtues, Intellectual and Moral. Section IV.--Of the Mean in Moral Virtue. Section V.--Of Cardinal Virtues. Section VI.--Of Prudence. Section VII.--Of Temperance. Section VIII.--Of Fortitude. Section IX.--Of Justice.
PART II.--DEONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER I
. (VI.)--OF THE ORIGIN OF MORAL OBLIGATION. Section I.--Of the natural difference between Good and Evil. Section II.--How Good becomes bounden Duty, and Evil is advanced to sin.

CHAPTER II
. (VII.)--OF THE ETERNAL LAW.

CHAPTER III
. (VIII.)--OF THE NATURAL LAW OF CONSCIENCE. Section I.--Of the Origin of Primary Moral Judgments. Section II.--Of the invariability of Primary Moral Judgments. Section III.--Of the immutability of the Natural Law. Section IV.--Of Probabilism.

CHAPTER IV
. (IX.)--OF THE SANCTION OF THE NATURAL LAW. Section