Moral Philosophy | Page 6

_Eth._, IX., ix., 5.) This is proved from the
consideration that happiness is the crown and perfection of human
nature; but the perfection of a thing lies in its ultimate act, or "second
act," that is, in its not merely being able to act, but acting. But action is
of two sorts. One proceeds from the agent to some outward matter, as
cutting and burning. This action cannot be happiness, for it does not
perfect the agent, but rather the patient. There is another sort of act
immanent in the agent himself, as feeling, understanding, and willing:
these perfect the agent. Happiness will be found to be one of these
immanent acts. Furthermore, there is action full of movement and
change, and there is an act done in stillness and rest. The latter, as will
presently appear, is happiness; and partly for this reason, and partly to
denote the exclusion of care and trouble, happiness is often spoken of
as a rest. It is also called _a state_, because one of the elements of
happiness is permanence. How the act of happiness can be permanent,
will appear hereafter.
3. _Happiness is an act in discharge of the function proper to man, as
man_. There is a function proper to the eye, to the ear, to the various
organs of the human body: there must be a function proper to man as
such. That can be none of the functions of the vegetative life, nor of the
mere animal life within him. Man is not happy by doing what a
rose-bush can do, digest and assimilate its food: nor by doing what a
horse does, having sensations pleasurable and painful, and muscular
feelings. Man is happy by doing what man alone can do in this world,
that is, acting by reason and understanding. Now the human will acting
by reason may do three things. It may regulate the passions, notably
desire and fear: the outcome will be the moral virtues of temperance
and fortitude. It may direct the understanding, and ultimately the
members of the body, in order to the production of some practical
result in the external world, as a bridge. Lastly, it may direct the
understanding to speculate and think, contemplate and consider, for
mere contemplation's sake. Happiness must take one or other of these
three lanes.
4. First, then, happiness is not the practice of the moral virtues of

temperance and fortitude. Temperance makes a man strong against the
temptations to irrationality and swinishness that come of the bodily
appetites. But happiness lies, not in deliverance from what would
degrade man to the level of the brutes, but in something which shall
raise man to the highest level of human nature. Fortitude, again, is not
exercised except in the hour of danger; but happiness lies in an
environment of security, not of danger. And in general, the moral
virtues can be exercised only upon occasions, as they come and go; but
happiness is the light of the soul, that must burn with steady flame and
uninterrupted act, and not be dependent on chance occurrences.
5. Secondly, happiness is not the use of the practical understanding
with a view to production. Happiness is an end in itself, a terminus
beyond which the act of the will can go no further; but this use of the
understanding is in view of an ulterior end, the thing to be produced.
That product is either useful or artistic; if useful, it ministers to some
further end still; if artistic, it ministers to contemplation. Happiness,
indeed, is no exercise of the practical understanding whatever. The
noblest exercises of practical understanding are for military purposes
and for statesmanship. But war surely is not an end in itself to any
right-minded man. Statecraft, too, has an end before it, the happiness of
the people. It is a labour in view of happiness. We must follow down
the third lane, and say:
6. _Happiness is the act of the speculative understanding contemplating
for contemplation's sake_. This act has all the marks of happiness. It is
the highest act of man's highest power. It is the most capable of
continuance. It is fraught with pleasure, purest and highest in quality. It
is of all acts the most self-sufficient and independent of environment,
provided the object be to the mind's eye visible. It is welcome for its
own sake, not as leading to any further good. It is a life of ease and
leisure: man is busy that he may come to ease.
7. Aristotle says of this life of continued active contemplation:
"Such a life will be too good for man; for not as he is man will he so
live, but inasmuch as there is a divine element in his composition. As
much as this element excels