Moral Philosophy | Page 2

is the rational sovereign good of man: but
to any one unmoved by that demonstration Ethics can have no more to
say. Ethics will not threaten, nor talk of duty, law, or punishment.
Ethics, thus strictly considered on an Aristotelian basis, are antecedent
to Natural Theology. They belong rather to Natural Anthropology: they
are a study of human nature. But as human nature points to God, so
Ethics are not wholly irrespective of God, considering Him as the
object of human happiness and worship,--the Supreme Being without
whom all the aspirations of humanity are at fault (pp. 13-26, 191-197).
Ethics do not refer to the commandments of God, for this simple reason,
that they have nothing to say to commandments, or laws, or obligation,

or authority. They are simply a system of moral hygiene, which a man
may adopt or not: only, like any other physician, the professor of Ethics
utters a friendly warning that misery must ensue upon the neglect of
what makes for health.
Deontology, not Ethics, expounds and vindicates the idea, I ought. It is
the science of Duty. It carries the mild suasions of Ethics into laws, and
out of moral prudence it creates conscience. And whereas Ethics do not
deal with sin, except under the aspect of what is called "philosophical
sin" (p. 119, § 6), Deontology defines sin in its proper theological sense,
as "an offence against God, or any thought, word, or deed against the
law of God." Deontology therefore presupposes and is consequent upon
Natural Theology. At the same time, while Ethics indicate a valuable
proof of the existence of God as the requisite Object of Happiness,
Deontology affords a proof of Him as the requisite Lawgiver. Without
God, man's rational desire is frustrate, and man's conscience a
misrepresentation of fact. [Footnote 1]
[Footnote 1: This is Cardinal Newman's proof of the existence of God
from Conscience: see pp. 124, 125, and _Grammar of Assent_, pp.
104-111, ed. 1895. With Newman's, "Conscience has both a critical and
a judicial office," compare Plato, _Politicus_, 260 B, [Greek:
sumpasaes taes gnostikaes to men epitaktikon meros, to de kritikon].
The "critical" office belongs to Ethics: the "judicial," or "preceptive"
office [Greek: to epitaktikon] to Deontology; and this latter points to a
Person who commands and judges, that is, to God.]
In this volume, pp. 1-108 make up the treatise on Ethics: pp. 109-176
that on Deontology.
Aristotle writes: "He that acts by intelligence and cultivates
understanding, is likely to be best disposed and dearest to God. For if,
as is thought, there is any care of human things on the part of the
heavenly powers, we may reasonably expect them to delight in that
which is best and most akin to themselves, that is, in intelligence, and
to make a return of good to such as supremely love and honour
intelligence, as cultivating the thing dearest to Heaven, and so behaving
rightly and well. Such, plainly, is the behaviour of the wise. The wise
man therefore is the dearest to God" (Nic. Eth. X. ix. 13). But Aristotle
does not work out the connexion between God and His law on the one
hand and human conscience and duty on the other. In that direction the

Stoics, and after them the Roman Jurists, went further than Aristotle.
By reason of this deficiency, Aristotle, peerless as he is in Ethics,
remains an imperfect Moral Philosopher.

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION (1918)
1. I have altered the opening pages in accordance with the Preface to
the edition of 1905.
2. I have added a paragraph on Syndicalism (pp. 291-2).
3. Also a new Table of _Addenda et Corrigenda_, and a new Index.
The quotations from St. Thomas may be read in English, nearly all of
them, in the Author's _Aquinas Ethicus_, 2 vols.; 12s. (Burns and
Oates.)

CONTENTS.
PART I.--ETHICS.

CHAPTER I
.--OF THE OBJECT-MATTER AND PARTITION OF MORAL
PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER II
.--OF HAPPINESS. Section I.--Of Ends. Section II.--Definition of
Happiness. Section III.--Happiness open to Man. Section IV.--Of the
Object of Perfect Happiness. Section V.--Of the use of the present life.

CHAPTER III
.--OF HUMAN ACTS. Section I.--What makes a human act less
voluntary. Section II.--Of the determinants of Morality in any given
action.

CHAPTER IV
.--OF PASSIONS. Section I.--Of Passions in general. Section II.--Of

Desire. Section III.--Of Delight. Section IV.--Of Anger.

CHAPTER V
.--OF HABITS AND VIRTUES. Section I.--Of Habit. Section II.--Of
Virtues in general. Section III.--Of the difference between Virtues,
Intellectual and Moral. Section IV.--Of the Mean in Moral Virtue.
Section V.--Of Cardinal Virtues. Section VI.--Of Prudence. Section
VII.--Of Temperance. Section VIII.--Of Fortitude. Section IX.--Of
Justice.
PART II.--DEONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER I
. (VI.)--OF THE ORIGIN OF MORAL OBLIGATION. Section I.--Of
the natural difference between Good and Evil. Section II.--How Good
becomes bounden