Moral Deliberations in Modern Cinema | Page 9

intentional (willed) patterns, his memory, are incompatible with those
demonstrated by Dan before the accident. Though he clearly is
possessed of a self-identity, we cannot say that he has the SAME
self-identity he possessed before the crash. In other words, we cannot
say that he, indeed, is Dan.
Dan himself does not feel that he has a self-identity at all. He discerns
intentional (willed) patterns in his manipulation of his environment but,
due to his amnesia, he cannot tell if these are consistent, or long term.
In other words, Dan has no memory. Moreover, others do not accept
him as Dan (or have their doubts) because they have no memory of Dan
as he is now.
Interim conclusion:
Having a memory is a necessary and sufficient condition for possessing
a self-identity.

III. Repression
Yet, resorting to memory to define identity may appear to be a circular
(even tautological) argument. When we postulate memory - don't we
already presuppose the existence of a "remembering agent" with an
established self-identity?
Moreover, we keep talking about "discerning", "intentional", or
"willed" patterns. But isn't a big part of our self (in the form of the
unconscious, full of repressed memories) unavailable to us? Don't we
develop defence mechanisms against repressed memories and fantasies,
against unconscious content incongruent with our self-image? Even
worse, this hidden, inaccessible, dynamically active part of our self is
thought responsible for our recurrent discernible patterns of behaviour.
The phenomenon of posthypnotic suggestion seems to indicate that this
may be the case. The existence of a self-identity is, therefore,
determined through introspection (by oneself) and observation (by
others) of merely the conscious part of the self.
But the unconscious is as much a part of one's self-identity as one's
conscious. What if, due to a mishap, the roles were reversed? What if
Dan's conscious part were to become his unconscious and his
unconscious part - his conscious? What if all his conscious memories,
drives, fears, wishes, fantasies, and hopes - were to become
unconscious while his repressed memories, drives, etc. - were to
become conscious? Would we still say that it is "the same" Dan and
that he retains his self-identity? Not very likely. And yet, one's
(unremembered) unconscious - for instance, the conflict between id and
ego - determines one's personality and self-identity.
The main contribution of psychoanalysis and later psychodynamic
schools is the understanding that self-identity is a dynamic, evolving,
ever-changing construct - and not a static, inertial, and passive entity. It
casts doubt over the meaningfulness of the question with which we
ended the exposition: "Who, exactly, then, is Dan?" Dan is different at
different stages of his life (Erikson) and he constantly evolves in
accordance with his innate nature (Jung), past history (Adler), drives
(Freud), cultural milieu (Horney), upbringing (Klein, Winnicott), needs
(Murray), or the interplay with his genetic makeup. Dan is not a thing -
he is a process. Even Dan's personality traits and cognitive style, which
may well be stable, are often influenced by Dan's social setting and by

his social interactions.
It would seem that having a memory is a necessary but insufficient
condition for possessing a self-identity. One cannot remember one's
unconscious states (though one can remember their outcomes). One
often forgets events, names, and other information even if it was
conscious at a given time in one's past. Yet, one's (unremembered)
unconscious is an integral and important part of one's identity and one's
self. The remembered as well as the unremembered constitute one's
self-identity.
IV. The Memory Link
Hume said that to be considered in possession of a mind, a creature
needs to have a few states of consciousness linked by memory in a kind
of narrative or personal mythology. Can this conjecture be equally
applied to unconscious mental states (e.g. subliminal perceptions,
beliefs, drives, emotions, desires, etc.)?
In other words, can we rephrase Hume and say that to be considered in
possession of a mind, a creature needs to have a few states of
consciousness and a few states of the unconscious - all linked by
memory into a personal narrative? Isn't it a contradiction in terms to
remember the unconscious?
The unconscious and the subliminal are instance of the general
category of mental phenomena which are not states of consciousness
(i.e., are not conscious). Sleep and hypnosis are two others. But so are
"background mental phenomena" - e.g., one holds onto one's beliefs
and knowledge even when one is not aware (conscious) of them at
every given moment.
We know that an apple will fall towards the earth, we know how to
drive a car ("automatically"), and we believe that the sun will rise
tomorrow, even though we do not spend every second of our waking
life consciously thinking about falling apples, driving cars, or the
position of the sun.
Yet, the