Memoirs of the Private Life, Return, and Reign of Napoleon in 1815, Vol. I | Page 2

will show, that Napoleon, far
from having fallen into a state of weakness, that would no longer
permit him to wield the sceptre, aspired, on the contrary, to be invested
with a temporary dictatorship, and that, when he consented to abdicate,
it was because the energetic attitude of the representatives disconcerted
him, and he yielded to the fear of adding the calamities of a civil war to
the disasters of a foreign invasion.
It was perfectly unknown too, that Napoleon was detained a prisoner at
Malmaison after his abdication. It was presumed, that he deferred his
departure, in the hope of being replaced at the head of the army and of
the government. These Memoirs will show, that this hope, if it dwelt
within the breast of Napoleon, was not the real motive of his stay in
France; and that he was detained there by the committee of government,
till the moment when, honour outweighing all political considerations,
it obliged Napoleon to depart, to prevent his falling into the hands of
Blucher.
The negotiations and conferences of the French plenipotentiaries with
the enemy's generals; the proceedings of the Prince of Eckmuhl; the
intrigues of the Duke of Otranto; the efforts of those members of the
committee, who remained faithful to their trust; the debates on the

capitulation of Paris, and all the collateral facts, connected with these
different circumstances, had been totally misrepresented; These
Memoirs establish or unfold the truth. They bring to light the conduct
of those members of the committee, who were supposed to be the
dupes or accomplices of Fouché; and that of the marshals, the army,
and the chambers. They contain also the correspondence of the
plenipotentiaries, and the instructions given to them; documents
hitherto unpublished, which will make known, what the politics and
wishes of the government of France at that time were.
Finally I shall observe, in order to complete the account I think it right
to give the reader of the substance of this work, that it furnishes
elucidations of the campaign of 1815, the want of which has been
imperiously felt. The causes, that determined Napoleon, to separate
from his army at Laon, were not known: I point them out. General
Gourgaud, in his narrative, could give no explanation of the march of
the corps of Count Erlon at the battle of Ligny, of the conduct of
Marshal Ney on the 16th, of the inactivity of Napoleon on the 17th, &c.
All these points, I believe, I have elucidated. I show also, that it was not,
as General Gourgaud and other writers assert, to raise the spirits, and
excite the courage of the French army, that its leader announced to it
the arrival of Marshal Grouchy. It is a certain fact, that Napoleon was
himself deceived by a brisk firing, which took place between the
Prussians and Saxons; and it is falsely, that he has been charged with
having knowingly deceived his soldiers, at a moment when the laws of
war and of humanity presented to him, to think rather of a retreat, than
of continuing the battle.
I had at first rejected from these Memoirs such official papers, as had
already been made known: but have since thought, that they ought to be
inserted. This work, which embraces all the events of the reign of a
Hundred Days, would be imperfect, if the reader were obliged to refer
to the papers of the day; to read or consult the act of the congress of
Vienna, that placed the Emperor Napoleon out of the pale of the law of
nations; the Additional Act, which occasioned his loss of popularity;
and the eloquent speeches and nervous declarations by which Napoleon,
his ministers, and his counsellors, sought to explain and justify the 20th

of March. I have thought, besides, that perhaps the reader would not
find it uninteresting, to witness the contests exhibited, at that important
period, between the legitimacy of nations and the legitimacy of
sovereigns.
The colours under which I represent Napoleon, the justice I do him for
the purity of his intentions, will not please all the world. Many persons,
who would blindly have believed any ill I could say of the ancient
sovereigns of France, will give little credit to my eulogies: they are
wrong: if praises lavished on power be suspicious, those bestowed on
the unfortunate will be true; to doubt them would be sacrilege.
Neither can I conceal from myself, that the men, who, from principle,
see nothing but a hateful conspiracy in the revolution of the 20th of
March, will accuse me of having embellished facts, and designedly
distorted the truth. No matter: I have depicted this revolution as I saw it,
as I felt it. How many others are pleased, to tarnish the honour of the
nation, to