Memoirs of the Courts and Cabinets of George the Third | Page 3

he would consent to enter upon the
Government in 1782. His Majesty desired nothing more than a list of
the persons Lord Rockingham wished to propose for the Cabinet; but
Lord Rockingham thought that something more was necessary to his
own security and independence. He considered that when a statesman
undertakes the duties of Administration, he assumes a responsibility
irrespective of the Sovereign, and that his duty requires of him that he
shall lay before His Majesty, in the first instance, as the basis of
negotiation, an outline of the measures by which alone he can conduct
the affairs of the kingdom with honour and success. In the adoption of
this clear and candid line of procedure there was no coercion on the
Sovereign, who was free to accept or reject the propositions, while the

constitutional principle at stake was acknowledged and vindicated on
both sides.
His Majesty's immobility on certain questions had the practical effect
of literally placing them in abeyance in the councils of his Ministers.
As it was found to be impossible to form a strong Administration that
should unanimously agree with His Majesty, and at the same time
possess the confidence of the country, no alternative remained but to
enter into a tacit arrangement, by which those questions were to be
dropped out of the list of what were called Cabinet measures, each
Minister being left at liberty to vote upon them as he pleased, without
being held to have compromised the opinions of the Government. Had
it not been for such an arrangement as this, Pitt, who was pledged to the
relief of the Catholics from their disabilities, could never have held
office under George III. And thus was introduced into the practice of
Administration a principle which is undoubtedly a violation of its
theory, and which, taking advantage of a dangerous precedent, has been
acted upon since with less justification.
In the invention of this escape for the conscience of the King through
the side vent of "open questions," the direct influence of the Sovereign
upon the councils of the Administration may be clearly traced. There
were no other means of reconciling His Majesty to the appointment of a
Cabinet, demanded by the voice of the Parliament and the country. The
dilemma was obvious. There was no choice between the rejection of
Ministers who held certain doctrines adverse to His Majesty's
convictions, and compromise upon the points of difference. When it
was found impossible to conduct the Government of the kingdom with
a Cabinet that did not possess the popular confidence, the Sovereign
was reduced to the necessity of treating with men who did possess that
confidence, whether he agreed with them in opinion or not. In our own
times, and under most of the Sovereigns who have filled the throne
since our Constitution may be said to have been settled, there could be
no great difficulty in a case of this kind. Ministers undertaking office
under such circumstances would be responsible to the country for their
policy, and the Sovereign would feel himself at once relieved by that
responsibility from all further anxiety. But George III. took that

responsibility upon himself in reference to the great measures that
occupied the public mind; and when, by the exigency of circumstances,
Ministers were pressed upon him from whose views he dissented, he
accepted them upon conditions which restrained the action of the
Cabinet, as a whole, in certain directions, but left its members
individually free and unpledged. Such was the origin of "open
questions." It was a compromise on both sides; and of course it must
always depend upon the extent to which this compromise is carried,
and the necessity under which it is resorted to, whether it should be
regarded as a sacrifice of principle on the part of the Minister who
submits to it.
Another novelty originating in this reign, out of the same peculiar state
of things, and resting upon a similar theory of expediency, was that of
the formation of a Coalition Administration, in which party differences
were merged in a common agreement upon a general line of policy. As
considerable light is thrown upon this memorable incident in the course
of these volumes, it is unnecessary to dwell upon it here. It will be
abundantly elucidated in the proper place. For the present, it is
sufficient to refer to the junction, in a composite Ministry of hostile
statesman, as one of the singular results flowing from that necessity of
adaptation to circumstances which was rendered unavoidable by the
unyielding character of the Sovereign.
There were other circumstances which, combined with the personal
dispositions of the King, led to the strenuous assertion in this reign of
the prerogatives of the Executive against the interference and control of
the aristocracy and the Parliament. From