Memoirs of Napoleon, vol 3 | Page 5

and ardently longed to return home.'
--['Erreurs' objects to this description of the complaints of the army, but
Savary (tome i. pp. 66, 67, and tome i. p. 89) fully confirms it, giving
the reason that the army was not a homogeneous body, but a mixed
force taken from Rome, Florence, Milan, Venice, Genoa, and
Marseilles; see also Thiers, tome v. p. 283. But the fact is not singular.
For a striking instance, in the days of the Empire, of the soldiers in

1809, in Spain, actually threatening Napoleon in his own hearing, see
De Gonneville (tome i. pp. 190- 193): "The soldiers of Lapisse's
division gave loud expression to the most sinister designs against the
Emperor's person, stirring up each other to fire a shot at him, sad
bandying accusations of cowardice for not doing it." He heard it all as
plainly as we did, and seemed as if be did not care a bit for it, but "sent
the division into good quarters, when the men were as enthusiastic as
they were formerly mutinous." In 1796 d'Entraigues, the Bourbon spy,
reports, "As a general rule, the French soldier grumbles and is
discontented. He accuses Bonaparte of being a thief and a rascal. But
to-morrow the very same soldier will obey him blindly" (Iung's
Bonaparte, tome iii. p. 152).]--
The illusion of the expedition had disappeared, and only its reality
remained. What bitter murmuring have I not heard from Murat, Lannes,
Berthier, Bessieres, and others! Their complaints were, indeed, often so
unmeasured as almost to amount to sedition. This greatly vexed
Bonaparte, and drew from him severe reproaches and violent language.
--[Napoleon related at St. Helena that in a fit of irritation he rushed
among a group of dissatisfied generals, and said to one of them, who
was remarkable for his stature, "you have held seditious language; but
take care I do not perform my duty. Though you are five feet ten inches
high, that shall not save you from being shot."--Bourrienne.]--
When the news arrived of the loss of the fleet, discontent increased. All
who had acquired fortunes under Napoleon now began to fear that they
would never enjoy them. All turned their thoughts to Paris, and its
amusements, and were utterly disheartened at the idea of being
separated from their homes and their friends for a period, the
termination of which it was impossible to foresee.
The catastrophe of Aboukir came like a thunderbolt upon the
General-in- Chief. In spite of all his energy and fortitude, he was
deeply distressed by the disasters which now assailed him. To the
painful feelings excited by the complaints and dejection of his
companions in arms was now added the irreparable misfortune of the
burning of our fleet. He measured the fatal consequences of this event

at a single glance. We were now cut off from all communication with
France, and all hope of returning thither, except by a degrading
capitulation with an implacable and hated enemy. Bonaparte had lost
all chance of preserving his conquest, and to him this was indeed a
bitter reflection. And at what a time did this disaster befall him? At the
very moment when he was about to apply for the aid of the
mother-country.
From what General Bonaparte communicated to me previously to the
1st of August, his object was, having once secured the possession of
Egypt; to return to Toulon with the fleet; then to send troops and
provisions of every kind to Egypt; and next to combine with the fleet
all the forces that could be supplied, not only by France, but by her
allies, for the purpose of attacking England. It is certain that previously
to his departure for Egypt he had laid before the Directory a note
relative to his plans. He always regarded a descent upon England as
possible, though in its result fatal, so long as we should be inferior in
naval strength; but he hoped by various manoeuvres to secure a
superiority on one point.
His intention was to return to France. Availing himself of the departure
of the English fleet for the Mediterranean, the alarm excited by his
Egyptian expedition, the panic that would be inspired by his sudden
appearance at Boulogne, and his preparations against England, he
hoped to oblige that power to withdraw her naval force from the
Mediterranean, and to prevent her sending out troops to Egypt. This
project was often in his head. He would have thought it sublime to date
an order of the day from the ruins of Memphis, and three months later,
one from London. The loss of the fleet converted all these bold
conceptions into mere romantic visions.
When alone with me he gave free vent to his emotion. I observed to
him that the disaster was doubtless great, but