Meditations | Page 6

the Painted Porch, or Stoa, which gave the Stoics their name. Next to
Zeno, the School of the Porch owes most to Chrysippus (280--207 b.c.),
who organised Stoicism into a system. Of him it was said, 'But for
Chrysippus, there had been no Porch.'
The Stoics regarded speculation as a means to an end and that end was,
as Zeno put it, to live consistently omologonuenws zhn or as it was
later explained, to live in conformity with nature. This conforming of
the life to nature oralogoumenwz th fusei zhn. was the Stoic idea of
Virtue.
This dictum might easily be taken to mean that virtue consists in
yielding to each natural impulse; but that was very far from the Stoic
meaning. In order to live in accord with nature, it is necessary to know
what nature is; and to this end a threefold division of philosophy is
made--into Physics, dealing with the universe and its laws, the
problems of divine government and teleology; Logic, which trains the
mind to discern true from false; and Ethics, which applies the
knowledge thus gained and tested to practical life. The Stoic system of
physics was materialism with an infusion of pantheism. In
contradiction to Plato's view that the Ideas, or Prototypes, of
phenomena alone really exist, the Stoics held that material objects
alone existed; but immanent in the material universe was a spiritual
force which acted through them, manifesting itself under many forms,

as fire, aether, spirit, soul, reason, the ruling principle.
The universe, then, is God, of whom the popular gods are
manifestations; while legends and myths are allegorical. The soul of
man is thus an emanation from the godhead, into whom it will
eventually be re-absorbed. The divine ruling principle makes all things
work together for good, but for the good of the whole. The highest
good of man is consciously to work with God for the common good,
and this is the sense in which the Stoic tried to live in accord with
nature. In the individual it is virtue alone which enables him to do this;
as Providence rules the universe, so virtue in the soul must rule man.
In Logic, the Stoic system is noteworthy for their theory as to the test
of truth, the Criterion. They compared the new-born soul to a sheet of
paper ready for writing. Upon this the senses write their impressions,
fantasias and by experience of a number of these the soul
unconsciously conceives general notions koinai eunoiai or anticipations.
prolhyeis When the impression was such as to be irresistible it was
called (katalnptikh fantasia) one that holds fast, or as they explained it,
one proceeding from truth. Ideas and inferences artificially produced by
deduction or the like were tested by this 'holding perception.' Of the
Ethical application I have already spoken. The highest good was the
virtuous life. Virtue alone is happiness, and vice is unhappiness.
Carrying this theory to its extreme, the Stoic said that there could be no
gradations between virtue and vice, though of course each has its
special manifestations. Moreover, nothing is good but virtue, and
nothing but vice is bad. Those outside things which are commonly
called good or bad, such as health and sickness, wealth and poverty,
pleasure and pain, are to him indifferent adiofora. All these things are
merely the sphere in which virtue may act. The ideal Wise Man is
sufficient unto himself in all things, autarkhs and knowing these truths,
he will be happy even when stretched upon the rack. It is probable that
no Stoic claimed for himself that he was this Wise Man, but that each
strove after it as an ideal much as the Christian strives after a likeness
to Christ. The exaggeration in this statement was, however, so obvious,
that the later Stoics were driven to make a further subdivision of things
indifferent into what is preferable (prohgmena) and what is undesirable.

They also held that for him who had not attained to the perfect wisdom,
certain actions were proper. (kaqhkonta) These were neither virtuous
nor vicious, but, like the indifferent things, held a middle place. Two
points in the Stoic system deserve special mention. One is a careful
distinction between things which are in our power and things which are
not. Desire and dislike, opinion and affection, are within the power of
the will; whereas health, wealth, honour, and other such are general1y
not so. The Stoic was called upon to control his desires and affections,
and to guide his opinion; to bring his whole being under the sway of the
will or leading principle, just as the universe is guided and governed by
divine Providence. This is a special application of the favourite Greek
virtue of moderation, (swfrosuum) and has also its parallel in Christian
ethics. The second