Mediaeval Socialism | Page 3

upheaval.
Society then felt the evils which attended this new condition of things,
and it was driven, according to this patristic idea, to search about for
remedies in order to restrain the anarchy which threatened to
overwhelm the very existence of the race. Hence was introduced first of
all the notion of a civil authority. It was found that without it, to use a
phrase which Hobbes indeed has immortalised, but which can be easily
paralleled from the writings of St. Ambrose or St. Augustine, "life was
nasty, brutish, and short." To this idea of authority, there was quickly
added the kindred ideas of private property and slavery. These two

were found equally necessary for the well-being of human society. For
the family became a determined group in which the patriarch wielded
absolute power; his authority could be effective only when it could be
employed not only over his own household, but also against other
households, and thus in defence of his own. Hence the family must
have the exclusive right to certain things. If others objected, the sole
arbitrament was an appeal to force, and then the vanquished not only
relinquished their claims to the objects in dispute, but became the
slaves of those to whom they had previously stood in the position of
equality and rivalry.
Thus do the Fathers of the Church justify these three institutions. They
are all the result of the Fall, and result from sin. Incidentally it may be
added that much of the language in which Hildebrand and others spoke
of the civil power as "from the devil" is traceable to this theological
concept of the history of its origin, and much of their hard language
means no more than this. Private property, therefore, is due to the Fall,
and becomes a necessity because of the presence of sin in the world.
But it is not only from the Fathers of the Church that the mediaeval
tradition drew its force. For parallel with this patristic explanation came
another, which was inherited from the imperial legalists. It was based
upon a curious fact in the evolution of Roman law, which must now be
shortly described.
For the administration of justice in Rome two officials were chosen,
who between them disposed of all the cases in dispute. One, the
Praetor Urbanus, concerned himself in all litigation between Roman
citizens; the other, the Praetor Peregrinus, had his power limited to
those matters only in which foreigners were involved; for the growth of
the Roman Imperium had meant the inclusion of many under its
suzerainty who could not boast technical citizenship. The Praetor
Urbanus was guided in his decisions by the codified law of Rome; but
the Praetor Peregrinus was in a very different position. He was left
almost entirely to his own resources. Hence it was customary for him,
on his assumption of office, to publish a list of the principles by which
he intended to settle all the disputes between foreigners that were

brought to his court. But on what foundation could his declaratory act
be based? He was supposed to have previously consulted the particular
laws of as many foreign nations as was possible, and to have selected
from among them those which were found to be held in common by a
number of tribes. The fact of this consensus to certain laws on the part
of different races was supposed to imply that these were fragments of
some larger whole, which came eventually to be called indifferently the
Law of Nature, or the Law of Nations. For at almost the very date when
this Law of Nations was beginning thus to be built up, the Greek notion
of one supreme law, which governed the whole race and dated from the
lost Golden Age, came to the knowledge of the lawyers of Rome. They
proceeded to identify the two really different concepts, and evolved for
themselves the final notion of a fundamental rule, essential to all moral
action. In time, therefore, this supposed Natural Law, from its
venerable antiquity and universal acceptance, acquired an added
sanction and actually began to be held in greater respect than even the
declared law of Rome. The very name of Nature seemed to bring with
it greater dignity. But at the same time it was carefully explained that
this Lex Naturae was not absolutely inviolable, for its more accurate
description was Lex or Jus Gentium. That is to say, it was not to be
considered as a primitive law which lay embedded like first principles
in human nature; but that it was what the nations had derived from
primitive principles, not by any force of logic, but by the simple
evolution of life. The human race had found by experience that the
observance of the natural law entailed as a