London to Ladysmith via Pretoria | Page 6

three months ago. But the British opinion was still unformed.
The delays and diplomatic disputes which have gradually roused the
nation to a sense of its responsibilities and perils, and which were
absolutely necessary if we were to embark on the struggle united, have
had an opposite effect out here. The attempts to satisfy the
conscientious public by giving the republics every possible opportunity
to accept our terms and the delays in the despatch of troops which were
an expensive tribute to the argument 'Do not seek peace with a sword,'
have been misinterpreted in South Africa. The situation in the Cape
Colony has become much graver. We have always been told of the

wonderful loyalty of the Dutch. It is possible that had war broken out
three months ago that loyalty would have been demonstrated for all
time. War after three months of hesitation--for such it was
considered--has proved too severe a test, and it is no exaggeration to
say that a considerable part of the Colony trembles on the verge of
rebellion. On such a state of public opinion the effect of any important
military reverse would be lamentable.
Nor is the military position such as to exclude anxiety. The swift flame
of war ran in a few days around the whole circle of the republican
frontiers. Far away to the north there was a skirmish at Tuli. On the
west Khama's territories are threatened with invasion. Mafeking is
surrounded, isolated, and manfully defending itself against continual
attack. Vryburg has been treacherously surrendered by its rebel
inhabitants to the enemy. Kimberley offers a serene front to a hesitating
attack, and even retaliates with armoured trains and other enterprises.
The southern frontier is armed, and menaced, and the expectation of
collision is strong. But it is on the eastern side that the Boers have
concentrated their greatest energies. They have gone Nap on Natal. The
configuration of the country favours an invader. The reader has
scarcely to look at the map, with which he is already familiar, to realise
how strategically powerful the Boer position was and is. The long
tongue of plain running up into the mountains could be entered from
both sides. The communications of the advanced garrisons would be
assailed: their retreat imperilled. The Boers seemed bound to clear
northern Natal of the troops. If, on the other hand, they were, or should
now be, suddenly driven back on their own country, they have only to
retire up the tongue of plain, with their exposed front narrowing every
mile between the mountains, and await their pursuers on the almost
inexpugnable position of Laing's Nek. Appreciating all this, their
leaders have wisely resolved to put forth their main strength against the
force in Natal, and by crushing it to rouse their sympathisers within the
Cape Colony. Should they succeed either on this front or on any other
to a serious extent, though the disaffection would not take a very
violent form, for all the bravoes have already joined the enemy, the
general insecurity would demand the employment of an army corps in
addition to that already on the seas.

A democratic Government cannot go to war unless the country is
behind it, and until it has general support must not place itself in a
position whence, without fighting, there is no retreat. The difficulty of
rallying public opinion in the face of the efforts of Mr. Morley, Mr.
Courtney, Sir William Harcourt, and others have caused a most
dangerous delay in the despatch of reinforcements. War has been
aggravated by the Peace Party; and thus these humanitarian gentlemen
are personally--for they occupy no official position--responsible for the
great loss of life. They will find their several consolations: Mr. Morley
will rejoice that he has faithfully pursued Mr. Gladstone's policy in
South Africa; Mr. Courtney that he has been consistent at all costs; Sir
William Harcourt that he has hampered the Government. But for those
who lose their sons and brothers in a quarrel thus unnecessarily
extended, there will only remain vain regrets, and to the eyewitness
only a bitter anger.
For the last three months the Imperial Government has been in the
unpleasant position of watching its adversaries grow continually
stronger without being able to make adequate counter-preparations.
But when once this initial disability has been stated, it must also be
admitted that the course of the military operations has been--apart from
their success or failure--very lucky. The Boers had the advantage of
drawing first blood, and the destruction of the armoured train near
Mafeking was magnified by them, as by the sensational Press in Great
Britain, into a serious disaster. A very bad effect was produced in the
undecided districts--it is perhaps wiser not to specify them at this
moment. But a few days later another armoured train