Logic | Page 8

of course, metaphysical
discussion is expected to be logical), but keeps the plain path of plain
beliefs, level with the comprehension of plain men. Metaphysics, as
examining the grounds of Logic itself, is sometimes regarded as 'the
higher Logic'; and, certainly, the study of Metaphysics is necessary to
every one who would comprehend the nature and functions of Logic, or
the place of his own mind and of Reason in the world.
(d) The relation of Logic to Psychology will be discussed in the next
section.
(e) As a Regulative Science, pointing out the conditions of true
inference (within its own sphere), Logic is co-ordinate with (i) Ethics,
considered as assigning the conditions of right conduct, and with (ii)
Æsthetics, considered as determining the principles of criticism and
good taste.
§ 6. Three principal schools of Logicians are commonly recognised:
Nominalist, Conceptualist, and Materialist, who differ as to what it is
that Logic really treats of: the Nominalists say, 'of language'; the

Conceptualists, 'of thought'; the Materialists, 'of relations of fact.' To
illustrate these positions let us take authors who, if some of them are
now neglected, have the merit of stating their contrasted views with a
distinctness that later refinements tend to obscure.
(a) Whately, a well-known Nominalist, regarded Logic as the Science
and Art of Reasoning, but at the same time as "entirely conversant
about language"; that is to say, it is the business of Logic to discover
those modes of statement which shall ensure the cogency of an
argument, no matter what may be the subject under discussion. Thus,
All fish are cold-blooded, .'. some cold-blooded things are fish: this is a
sound inference by the mere manner of expression; and equally sound
is the inference, All fish are warm-blooded, .'. some warm-blooded
things are fish. The latter proposition may be false, but it follows; and
(according to this doctrine) Logic is only concerned with the consistent
use of words: the truth or falsity of the proposition itself is a question
for Zoology. The short-coming of extreme Nominalism lies in speaking
of language as if its meaning were unimportant. But Whately did not
intend this: he was a man of great penetration and common-sense.
(b) Hamilton, our best-known Conceptualist, defined Logic as the
science of the "formal laws of thought," and "of thought as thought,"
that is, without regard to the matter thought about. Just as Whately
regarded Logic as concerned merely with cogent forms of statement, so
Hamilton treated it as concerned merely with the necessary relations of
thought. This doctrine is called Conceptualism, because the simplest
element of thought is the Concept; that is, an abstract idea, such as is
signified by the word man, planet, colour, virtue; not a representative
or generic image, but the thought of all attributes common to any class
of things. Men, planets, colours, virtuous actions or characters, have,
severally, something in common on account of which they bear these
general names; and the thought of what they have in common, as the
ground of these names, is a Concept. To affirm or deny one concept of
another, as Some men are virtuous, or No man is perfectly virtuous, is
to form a Judgment, corresponding to the Proposition of which the
other schools of Logic discourse. Conceptualism, then, investigates the
conditions of consistent judgment.

To distinguish Logic from Psychology is most important in connection
with Conceptualism. Concepts and Judgments being mental acts, or
products of mental activity, it is often thought that Logic must be a
department of Psychology. It is recognised of course, that Psychology
deals with much more than Logic does, with sensation, pleasure and
pain, emotion, volition; but in the region of the intellect, especially in
its most deliberate and elaborate processes, namely, conception,
judgment, and reasoning, Logic and Psychology seem to occupy
common ground. In fact, however, the two sciences have little in
common except a few general terms, and even these they employ in
different senses. It is usual to point out that Psychology tries to explain
the subjective processes of conception, judgment and reasoning, and to
give their natural history; but that Logic is wholly concerned with the
results of such processes, with concepts, judgments and reasonings, and
merely with the validity of the results, that is, with their truth or
consistency; whilst Psychology has nothing to do with their validity,
but only with their causes. Besides, the logical judgment (in Formal
Logic at least) is quite a different thing from the psychological: the
latter involves feeling and belief, whereas the former is merely a given
relation of concepts. S is P: that is a model logical judgment; there can
be no question of believing it; but it is logically valid if M is P and S is
M. When, again, in Logic, one deals with