Life and Times of Washington, vol 2 (Revised, Enlarged, and Enriched) | Page 9

was to cross the Sound. With
about 170 of his detachment, under convoy of two armed sloops, he
proceeded (May 23, 1777) across the Sound to the north division of the
island near Southhold in the neighborhood of which a small foraging
party against which the expedition was in part directed, was supposed
to lie, but they had marched two days before to New York. The boats
were conveyed across the land, a distance of about fifteen miles, into a
bay which deeply intersects the eastern end of Long Island, where the
troops re- embarked. Crossing the bay they landed at 2 in the morning,
about four miles from Sag Harbor, which they completely surprised
and carried with charged bayonets. At the same time a division of the
detachment secured the armed schooner and the vessels laden with
forage, which were set on fire and entirely consumed. Six of the enemy

were killed and ninety taken prisoners. A very few escaped under cover
of the night.
The object of his expedition being effected without the loss of a man,
Colonel Meigs returned to Guilford with his prisoners. "Having," as
was stated in the letter to General Parsons, "moved with such
uncommon celerity as to have transported his men by land and water 90
miles in 25 hours." Congress directed a sword to be presented to him,
and passed a resolution expressing the high sense entertained of his
merit, and of the prudence, activity, and valor displayed by himself and
his party.
The exertions made by Washington through the winter to raise a
powerful army for the ensuing campaign had not been successful. The
hopes respecting its strength, which the flattering reports made from
every quarter had authorized him to form, were cruelly disappointed,
and he found himself not only unable to carry into effect the offensive
operations he had meditated, but unequal even to defensive warfare.
That steady and persevering courage, however, which had supported
himself and the American cause through the gloomy scenes of the
preceding year did not forsake him, and that sound judgment which
applies to the best advantage those means which are attainable,
however inadequate they may be, still remained. His plan of operations
was adapted to that which he believed his enemy had formed. He was
persuaded either that General Burgoyne, who was then at Quebec,
would endeavor to take Ticonderoga and to penetrate to the Hudson, in
which event General Howe would cooperate with him by moving up
that river, and attempting to possess himself of the forts and high
grounds commanding its passage, or that Burgoyne would join the
grand army at New York by sea, after which the combined armies
would proceed against Philadelphia.
To counteract the designs of the enemy, whatever they might be, to
defend the three great points, Ticonderoga, the Highlands of New York,
and Philadelphia, against two powerful armies so much superior to him
in arms, in numbers, and in discipline, it was necessary to make such an
arrangement of his troops as would enable the parts reciprocally to aid
each other without neglecting objects of great and almost equal
magnitude, which were alike threatened, and were far asunder. To
effect these purposes, the troops of New England and New York were

divided between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from Jersey to
North Carolina inclusive, were directed to assemble at the camp to be
formed in Jersey. The more southern troops remained in that State for
its protection.
These arrangements being made and the recruits collected, the camp at
Morristown was broken up, the detachments called in, and the army
assembled at Middlebrook (May 28, 1777), just behind a connected
ridge of strong and commanding heights north of the road leading to
Philadelphia, and about ten miles from Brunswick.
This camp, the approaches to which were naturally difficult,
Washington took care to strengthen still further by entrenchments. The
heights in front commanded a prospect of the course of the Raritan, the
road to Philadelphia, the hills about Brunswick, and a considerable part
of the country between that place and Amboy, so as to afford him a full
view of the most interesting movements of the enemy.
The force brought into the field by the United States required all the aid
which could be derived from strong positions and unremitting vigilance.
On the 20th of May (1777) the army in Jersey, excluding cavalry and
artillery, amounted to only 8,378 men, of whom upwards of 2,000 were
sick. The effective rank and file were only 5,738.
Had this army been composed of the best disciplined troops, its
inferiority in point of numbers must have limited its operations to
defensive war, and have rendered it incompetent to the protection of
any place whose defense would require a battle in the open field. But