Leviathan | Page 7

Fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons, as make use of such
superstitious feare, to pass disguised in the night, to places they would
not be known to haunt.
From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong
Fancies, from vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the
Religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes,
nymphs, and the like; and now adayes the opinion than rude people
have of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For
as for Witches, I think not that their witch craft is any reall power; but
yet that they are justly punished, for the false beliefe they have, that
they can do such mischiefe, joyned with their purpose to do it if they
can; their trade being neerer to a new Religion, than to a Craft or
Science. And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has
I think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit
the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such
inventions of Ghostly men. Neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but God
can make unnaturall Apparitions. But that he does it so often, as men
need to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or change, of
the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of
Christian faith. But evill men under pretext that God can do any thing,
are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though they
think it untrue; It is the part of a wise man, to believe them no further,
than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If this
superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques
from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things depending
thereon, by which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people,
men would be much more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.
And this ought to be the work of the Schooles; but they rather nourish
such doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are),
what they receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise of
themselves, and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly
from the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man,

by God; and evill thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are
powred (infused) into a man, by God; and evill ones by the Divell.
Some say the Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to
the Common-sense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the
Fancy, and the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the
Judgement, like handing of things from one to another, with many
words making nothing understood.
Understanding. The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other
creature indued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other
voluntary signes, is that we generally call Understanding; and is
common to Man and Beast. For a dogge by custome will understand
the call, or the rating of his Master; and so will many other Beasts. That
Understanding which is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely
his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and
contexture of the names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and
other formes of Speech: And of this kinde of Understanding I shall
speak hereafter.
CHAPTER III
OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAYNE OF IMAGINATIONS
By Consequence, or Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession
of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from
Discourse in words) Mentall Discourse.
When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after,
is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought to
every Thought succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination,
whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we
have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never
had the like before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this. All
Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense:
And those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense,
continue also together after Sense: In so much as the former comming
again to take place, and be praedominant, the later followeth, by

coherence of the matter moved, is such manner, as water upon a plain
Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger.
But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes
one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe in time, that
in the Imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall
Imagine next; Onely this