Lessons of the War | Page 6

combination was imperfect.
On Friday morning the Landman's Drift column, which had been
reinforced during the previous days by a part of the Newcastle column,
was in position on the two hills to the east of Dundee, and began
shelling the British camp at long range. At the same time the column
from the north was within an easy march from the British position. Sir
Penn Symons decided promptly to attack the Landman's Drift column
and to check the northern column's advance. Three battalions and a
couple of batteries were devoted to the attack of the Boer position,
while a battalion and a battery were sent along the north road to delay
the approaching column. Both measures were successful. The attack on
the Boer position of Talana or Smith's Hill was a sample of good
tactical work, in which the three arms, or if mounted infantry may be
considered a special arm, the four arms, were alike judiciously and
boldly handled. The co-operation of rifle and gun, of foot and horse,
was well illustrated, and the Boer force was after a hard fight driven
from its position and pursued to the eastward. Unhappily, Sir Penn

Symons, who himself took charge of the fight, was mortally wounded
at the moment of victory, leaving the command of the force in the
hands of the brigadier, Lieut.-Colonel Yule. The northern Boer column
seems to have disappeared early in the day. Possibly only its advance
guard was within striking distance and had no orders to make an
independent attack on the British delaying force.
On Saturday morning Sir George White sent a small force of cavalry
and artillery to reconnoitre along the line of the interrupted railway.
Some two thousand Boers were found in position near Elandslaagte,
and accordingly during the day the British were reinforced by road and
rail from Ladysmith, until in the afternoon the Boer position could be
attacked by two battalions, three batteries, two cavalry regiments, and a
regiment and a half of mounted infantry--about three thousand five
hundred men. The Boers were completely crushed and a large number
of prisoners taken, including the commander and the commanding
officer of the German contingent. The British loss, however, as at
Glencoe, was heavy, especially in officers. The force returned on
Sunday to Ladysmith.
The British force at Dundee-Glencoe was thus still isolated, and until
now no detailed account of its movements has reached England. On
Saturday it was again attacked and, there is reason to believe, it again
repulsed a large Boer force, probably the main northern column. On
Sunday also the attack seems to have been renewed, this time
apparently by two columns, one of which may have been composed of
Free State troops from Muller's Pass. Either on Sunday or Monday
General Yule determined to withdraw from a position in which he
could hardly hope without destruction to resist the overwhelming
numbers brought to bear against him, especially as the Boer forces,
either from the direction of Muller's Pass or from Bester's Station, were
threatening his line of retreat by the Glencoe-Ladysmith road.
Accordingly, leaving in hospital at Dundee those of his wounded who
could not be moved, he retired along the Helpmakaar road, which he
followed as far as Beith, about fourteen miles from Dundee, and near
there he bivouacked on Monday night. On Tuesday he continued his
march from Beith towards Ladysmith, expecting to reach Sunday's
River, about sixteen miles, by dark. Sir George White, informed of this
movement and of the presence of a strong Boer force to the west of the

Ladysmith-Glencoe road, set out on Tuesday morning to interpose
between this force and General Yule, and by delivering a smart attack
at Reitfontein was able for that day to cover the retreat of General
Yule's brigade.
The Boer Commander-in-Chief has thus, apparently, failed in his
attempt to crush one wing of the British force, and has accomplished no
more than bringing about its return to the main body, which must have
been a part of the original British plan, unless it was thought that a
British brigade was capable of defeating four times its own number of
Boers.
The net result hitherto seems to be that the Boers have had the
strategical and the British the tactical advantage. The British troops
have proved their superiority; the Boers have shown that even against
troops of better training, spirit, and discipline, numbers must tell,
especially if directed according to a sound though not always
perfectly-executed plan.

PLAYING WITH FIRE
_November 1st_, 1899
The first week's campaign, dimly seen through scanty information,
gives a peculiar impression of the two armies. The British force seems
like an athlete in fine training but without an idea except that of
self-preservation, while the Boer army resembles a burly labourer,
clumsy in