Lectures on Land Warfare | Page 9

involved in battle with his right wing. When
the rattle of musketry and booming of the guns showed that his right
was engaged, Napoleon launched Murat, Bernadotte, and Soult against
the allied centre; when Soult was master of the village and the knoll,
and as the broken remnants of the enemy's centre were streaming down
the reverse slopes of the Pratzen Ridge, the French centre wheeled
round to the right and threw itself upon the flank and rear of the
Russians, who were still heavily engaged in their original attack. These
operations were completely successful and over 40,000 of the opposing
armies were accounted for. Wellington defeated Soult at Sauroren in
the Pyrenees (July 28, 1813) by taking advantage of a minor incident.
He had ridden forward to see the disposition of the French forces, and
as his men cheered him all along the line, he turned to his staff and said,
"Soult is a very cautious commander. He will delay his attack to find
out what those cheers mean; that will give time for the Sixth Division
to arrive and I shall beat him"--and the event turned out exactly as he
had predicted. Generals R. E. Lee and T. J. Jackson frequently played
upon the nervousness of President Lincoln for the safety of Washington,
and by threatening to cross the Potomac induced him to withdraw
troops that were advancing against Richmond.
NATIONAL MORAL.--The moral fibre of the nation and of the troops
must also be taken into consideration. "The common theory that, in
order to win, an army must have superiority of rifles and cannon, better
bases, more wisely chosen positions, is radically false. For it leaves out
of account the most important part of the {11} problem, that which
animates it and makes it live, man--with his moral, intellectual, and
physical qualities" (Marshal Foch).
DISCIPLINE AND MORALITY.--The discipline, courage, and

endurance of the troops, as well as the cause for which they are fighting,
are at least of equal importance to their armament and numbers. "If
their discipline and leading be defective, Providence seldom sides with
the big battalions . . . and troops that cannot march are untrustworthy
auxiliaries" ("The Science of War"). "An army which cannot march
well is almost certain to be outmanoeuvred. A general whose strategy is
based upon time calculations that are rendered inaccurate by the
breakdown of the marching power of his troops runs grave risk of
disaster. It is therefore necessary that the question of marching should
be studied, not only by generals and staff officers, but by regimental
officers and men. It is on the latter that the hardships and exertions fall,
and their cheerful endurance can best be ensured by teaching them the
great results attainable by an army which can move faster and further
than its adversary, as well as the dangers incurred by an army which
allows itself to be out-marched. . . . Superior mobility alone enabled
Frederick the Great to move 'like a panther round an ox' so as to place
his army across the enemy's flank. The discipline of his troops enabled
him to apply the principles of combination" (General Sir E. B. Hamley).
"Nothing compensates for absence of discipline; and the constant
watchfulness that is necessary in war, even when danger seems remote,
can only be secured by discipline, which makes of duty a habit"
(General R. Taylor, C.S. Army). At the Battle of Hastings (Oct. 14,
1066) lack of discipline and disobedience of orders changed the fate of
the English nation and brought about the Norman Conquest. Harold,
the English king, had defeated the forces of Harold Hadraade, {12}
King of Norway, at Stamford Bridge in Yorkshire (Sept. 25, 1066).
Four days later, Duke William of Normandy landed in Pevensey Bay,
with 60,000 horse and foot. Harold hastened south to meet him with
troops exhausted by battle and marching. After halting six days in
London to collect reinforcements, the English force entrenched itself on
the hill of Sautlache and awaited attack. The Normans were unable to
penetrate the abattis, but they gained the victory which changed the
whole history of the English race by the stratagem of a feigned retreat.
Harold's undisciplined auxiliaries, contrary to direct orders (which were
obeyed by the "regular" troops in the centre), swarmed out of the
palisades in pursuit of the fleeing Normans, who suddenly turned about
and penetrated the English lines mingled with the discomfited

auxiliaries. Had the "irregulars" shown the same sense of discipline as
the "regulars" there had been no Norman Conquest.
With regard to marching, General T. J. Jackson once observed, in reply
to an allusion to his severe marching, that "it is better to lose one man
in marching than five in fighting." Acting on this principle he
invariably surprised his enemy, the most