. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Principles of War--Popular fallacies--Authorities quoted in support of
Fixed Principles (Gen. B. Taylor, C. S. Army; Marshal Foch; Marshal
Haig)--Necessity for Study (Gen. Sir E. B. Hamley; Marshal French;
Marshal Foch; Napoleon)--"Common Sense" (Abraham Lincoln and
Jefferson Davis; General Grant)--"Higher Ranks" Fallacy (Col.
Henderson; Gen. Sir E. B. Hamley)--Necessity for Study proved (Col.
Henderson).
STRATEGY AND TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23
Definitions--Theatre of Operations the Kingdom of Strategy; Field of
Battle the Province of Tactics--Tactics subservient to Strategy (Lord
Roberts's Advance; First Battle of Somme; First Battle of Cambrai;
Gen. Lew Wallace at the Monocacy; Marshal Grouchy at
Wavre)--Moral--Idiosyncracies of leaders (Napoleon at Austerlitz;
Wellington at Sauroren; Lee and Jackson versus Abraham
Lincoln)--National Moral (Foch, quoted)--Discipline and Mobility
(Battle of Hastings)--Marching Power (Stonewall
Jackson)--Time--Weather--Health--Human Nature (Fabius and Roman
people; McClellan and his Government; Thomas at Nashville; Roberts
in South Africa)--The Spirit of France ("Nous sommes trahis" of 1870
and cheers of the poilus in 1917)--Great Britain--America--Lord
Roberts's previous warning ("Germany strikes when Germany's hour
has struck")--Col. Henderson on moral of British and American
troops--"The Contemptible Little Army"--The New Armies (Tribute
from Marshal Haig endorsed by Marshal Foch)--Changes in Methods
of Warfare--Value of official Text-books.
THE BATTLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-32
The Battle is the "only argument" of War--Characteristics of the Battle
(Issue uncertain; Human factor; Value of Reserves; Superiority at point
of Attack)--Lee's "partial attacks" at Malvern Hill of no avail--Phases
of the Battle--Information and the Initiative (Salamanca; First Battle of
the Marne; Battle of Baccarat)--Development of the Battle (Surprise;
"Like a bolt from the blue" as at Chancellorsville or First Battle of
Cambrai; Marshal Foch on value of Surprise)--The Decisive
Blow--Arbela.
{x}
HOW BATTLES ARE INFLUENCED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33-44
Commander's influence by his Orders and by his employment of
Reserves--Subordinates must "bring to fruit the scheme of the higher
command"--The "fog of battle"--Information--Co-operation (on grand
scale at First Battle of the Marne; on minor scale at Gneudecourt)--Fire
Tactics--Value of withholding fire (Heights of Abraham; Bunker Hill;
Fredericksburg; Retreat from Mons)--Enfilade and Reverse Fire (The
Bluff in Ypres Salient)--Movement--Advancing under
Fire--Withdrawing under Fire in "Delaying Action"--Holding on
(Untimely surrender at Soissons; Stubborn defence at First and Second
Battles of Ypres; Trônes Wood; Bourlon Village; Polygon Wood;
Givenchy)--Covering Fire--Fire and Movement inseparably associated.
TYPES OF BATTLE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45-50
Three distinct systems--The Defensive Battle seldom effects positive
results (Gettysburg; Fredericksburg)--The Offensive Battle
(Marlborough; Frederick the Great; Napoleon; Wellington; Grant;
Franco-Prussian War; Battle of Blenheim described)--The
Defensive-Offensive Battle (Marengo; Austerlitz; Dresden; Vittoria;
Orthez; Toulouse; Waterloo; Final Battles of the Great War; Battle of
Waterloo described)--Opportunities for "restoring" the battle
(Antietam)--Chancellorsville a great Defensive-Offensive
Battle--Passing from the "guard" to the "thrust" (Second Battle of the
Marne).
THE ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51-69
Culminating point of all manoeuvres--Quick decision required or
"Position Warfare" will supervene--Second Battle of the
Somme--Methods of Attack--Two plans--Decisive blow on
pre-determined spot or in direction ascertained by fighting--Strength of
the Attack--Disposition of the Troops--Forward Body, Supports and
Local Reserves--General Reserve--The Commander's Plans--The
Position of Assembly (Banks's single column defeated by Forrest in
Red River Valley)--The Attacking Force (St. Privat; Plevna)--The
Decisive Attack--Advantages and Disadvantages of Frontal and Flank
Attacks--Decisive Attack must be followed up (Gettysburg;
Chattanooga)--Detailing the Units--Artillery in Attack (Verneville;
Colenso; mobility and protection of modern Artillery)--Cavalry in
Attack (Appomattox and Paardeberg; Ramadie; Bagdadieh; Gaines's
Mill; Gettysburg; First Battle of Cambrai; Battle of Amiens; Second
Battle of Le Cateau; Archangel Front; Battle of the Sambre)--Royal
Engineers--Medical Arrangements--Supply--Commander's
Position--Battle Reports--Reorganisation and Pursuit ("Success must be
followed up until the enemy's power is ruined.")
FORMATION OF INFANTRY FOR THE ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . .
70-75
The Platoon (Square and Diamond Formations; Ground Scouts; Flank
Scouts; Behind a Barrage)--The Platoon Commander ("Appreciating
the situation")--The Company--The Company Commander--The
Battalion--The Battalion Commander (Personal examples; Monchy le
Preux; Battle of Cambrai; Second Battle of the Somme).
{xi}
DEFENSIVE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76-97
Counter-attack the soul of Defence--Reasons for adopting defensive
attitude (Chancellorsville)--Defensive-Offensive Battles (Marengo,
Austerlitz, and Waterloo)--Obligatory Defensive--(Nachod;
Continue reading on your phone by scaning this QR Code
Tip: The current page has been bookmarked automatically. If you wish to continue reading later, just open the
Dertz Homepage, and click on the 'continue reading' link at the bottom of the page.