Laches | Page 5

Plato
say?' The one is the thoughtful general, willing to
avail himself of any discovery in the art of war (Aristoph. Aves); the
other is the practical man, who relies on his own experience, and is the
enemy of innovation; he can act but cannot speak, and is apt to lose his
temper. It is to be noted that one of them is supposed to be a hearer of
Socrates; the other is only acquainted with his actions. Laches is the
admirer of the Dorian mode; and into his mouth the remark is put that
there are some persons who, having never been taught, are better than
those who have. Like a novice in the art of disputation, he is delighted
with the hits of Socrates; and is disposed to be angry with the
refinements of Nicias.
In the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue--'What is Courage?'
the antagonism of the two characters is still more clearly brought out;
and in this, as in the preliminary question, the truth is parted between
them. Gradually, and not without difficulty, Laches is made to pass on
from the more popular to the more philosophical; it has never occurred
to him that there was any other courage than that of the soldier; and
only by an effort of the mind can he frame a general notion at all. No
sooner has this general notion been formed than it evanesces before the
dialectic of Socrates; and Nicias appears from the other side with the
Socratic doctrine, that courage is knowledge. This is explained to mean
knowledge of things terrible in the future. But Socrates denies that the
knowledge of the future is separable from that of the past and present;
in other words, true knowledge is not that of the soothsayer but of the
philosopher. And all knowledge will thus be equivalent to all virtue--a
position which elsewhere Socrates is not unwilling to admit, but which
will not assist us in distinguishing the nature of courage. In this part of
the Dialogue the contrast between the mode of cross-examination
which is practised by Laches and by Socrates, and also the manner in
which the definition of Laches is made to approximate to that of Nicias,

are worthy of attention.
Thus, with some intimation of the connexion and unity of virtue and
knowledge, we arrive at no distinct result. The two aspects of courage
are never harmonized. The knowledge which in the Protagoras is
explained as the faculty of estimating pleasures and pains is here lost in
an unmeaning and transcendental conception. Yet several true
intimations of the nature of courage are allowed to appear: (1) That
courage is moral as well as physical: (2) That true courage is
inseparable from knowledge, and yet (3) is based on a natural instinct.
Laches exhibits one aspect of courage; Nicias the other. The perfect
image and harmony of both is only realized in Socrates himself.
The Dialogue offers one among many examples of the freedom with
which Plato treats facts. For the scene must be supposed to have
occurred between B.C. 424, the year of the battle of Delium, and B.C.
418, the year of the battle of Mantinea, at which Laches fell. But if
Socrates was more than seventy years of age at his trial in 399 (see
Apology), he could not have been a young man at any time after the
battle of Delium.
LACHES, OR COURAGE.
by
Plato
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Lysimachus, son of Aristides.
Melesias, son of Thucydides. Their sons. Nicias, Laches, Socrates.
LYSIMACHUS: You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in
armour, Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the
reason why my friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see
him. I think that we may as well confess what this was, for we certainly
ought not to have any reserve with you. The reason was, that we were
intending to ask your advice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising
others, and when they are asked will not say what they think. They
guess at the wishes of the person who asks them, and answer according
to his, and not according to their own, opinion. But as we know that
you are good judges, and will say exactly what you think, we have
taken you into our counsels. The matter about which I am making all
this preface is as follows: Melesias and I have two sons; that is his son,
and he is named Thucydides, after his grandfather; and this is mine,

who is also called after his grandfather, Aristides. Now, we are
resolved to take the greatest care of the youths, and not to let them run
about as they like, which
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