Knights of Malta, 1523-1798 | Page 6

Corsair was in command. The proud Turkish
generals were unwilling to be under the orders of men who were of
doubtful antecedents, and whom they despised in their hearts as
low-born robbers. Even Barbarossa, acknowledged by all to be the
greatest seaman in the Turkish Empire, could not enforce strict
obedience in the campaign of Prevesa in 1538. The Grand Vizier
Ibrahim had seen the folly of putting generals in command of fleets,
and had therefore secured the promotion of Barbarossa: but Ibrahim
was now dead, and Solyman, bereft of his wise counsel, made a
compromise.
On May 18 the Turkish fleet was sighted off the island, and almost
immediately the army disembarked, partly at Marsa Scirocco, and
partly at St. Thomas's Bay. The first misfortune was the
non-appearance of Dragut at the rendezvous, and in his absence
Mustapha and Piali decided to attack St. Elmo and to leave to Dragut
the responsibility of sanctioning the operations or breaking them off.
Batteries were erected on Mount Sceberras, in which ten 80-pounders
were brought into action, besides a huge basilisk throwing balls of 160
pounds, and two 60-pounder coulevrines. The Turks at the height of
their power put great faith in novel and massive artillery, which, though

clumsy, and at times more dangerous to their own gunners than the
enemy, was terribly effective at the short distance it was placed from St.
Elmo. The walls of the fortress soon began to crumble under the
continuous bombardment, and the garrison, which had been increased
to 120 Knights and two companies of Spanish infantry, soon felt the
position untenable without reinforcements. As an attack had not yet
been delivered La Valette was incensed at the appeal for help and
offered to go himself to hold the fort; his council dissuaded him from
doing so, and he permitted 50 Knights and 200 Spanish troops to cross
to St. Elmo. It was of the utmost importance that St. Elmo should be
held to the last minute. Not only did it delay the attack on the main
forts, but Don Garcia de Toledo, the Viceroy of Sicily, had made it a
condition in his arrangements with the Grand Master, before the siege,
that St. Elmo must be held if the reinforcements from Sicily were to be
sent.
At this point--June 2--Dragut arrived with his galleys and expressed
nothing but disapproval for the Turkish operations. He pointed out that
the besiegers should have isolated the fortifications from the rest of the
island before proceeding to attack St. Elmo; but, as the siege had
started, he insisted on continuing it as vigorously as possible. He
erected a powerful battery on the summit of Mount Sceberras, which
swept both Fort St. Angelo and Fort St. Elmo, and erected another on
the headland opposite St. Elmo on the other side of the Marsa Muscetto,
which was henceforth known as Point Dragut.
As soon as this was done the bombardment restarted with relentless
fury. The Knights made a sortie to destroy some of the Turkish guns,
but were driven back, and the Turks then captured and held a covered
way leading up to a ravelin; a few days later, taking advantage of the
negligence of the garrison, they surprised the ravelin itself, and, but for
the efforts of a Spanish officer, would have captured the fort. After
desperate fighting the Knights were still holding the fort, but had been
unable to recapture the ravelin. The next day another attack was made
by Mustapha, but without avail; the ravelin remained in Turkish hands,
but it had cost them 2,000 men.

It was a great gain, however; two guns were mounted on it, and all the
Turkish artillery, including that of the galleys, began to play on the
hapless fort. It was no question of a breach; the walls were gradually
destroyed till there was nothing left of the enceinte but a mass of ruins.
Every part of the fort was directly exposed to the fire of the two guns
on the ravelin, and this exposure made the strain on the Knights
intolerable.
The garrison sent a Knight, renowned for his bravery, to report these
conditions to the Grand Master and to ask for permission to withdraw.
La Valette, feeling it imperative that the fort should hold out to the last
minute, sent him back with orders that it was to be defended to the end.
The garrison, amazed by his reply, sent a prayer for relief, failing which
they would sally forth, sword in hand, to meet their death in open fight
rather than be buried like dogs beneath the ruins. The Grand Master
received the request with the stern comment that, not only were their
lives at the disposal of the Order, but the time and manner of their
death; but to make