Knickerbocker | Page 4

if it commanded us to worship Sin and leave our passions
unbridled.'
Well said! And in so saying, you acknowledge yourself to be governed
by the same principle which actuates the ultra-transcendentalist; the
moral sense or instinct, similar to the 'inward light' of the Friends. After
all, I apprehend the true point in which men differ is, whether this
moral sense is really an instinct, or whether it is evolved and put in
operation by education. How much is due to nature? is the true question.
But to solve it, is important only theoretically, for practically we all act
alike; we cannot, if we would, separate the educational from the natural
moral sense; we cannot uneducate it, and then judge by it, freed from
all circumstantial bias. But whether more or less indebted either to
nature or education, it is to this moral and religious sense that the
ultra-transcendentalist refers every question, and passes judgment
according to its verdict. It is sometimes rather vaguely called the 'Pure
Reason;' but that is only a term, hardly a 'mouthful of articulate wind.'
'You and I shall agree very well together, I see,' replied my friend. 'If
we dispute at all, it will be foolishly about the meaning of a word. All
the world have been doing that ever since the confusion of tongues at
Babel. That great event prophetically shadowed forth the future; for
now, as then, the confusion and disputation is greatest when we are
striving most earnestly to reach heaven by our earth-built contrivances.
We may draw a lesson therefrom; not to be too aspiring for our means;
for our inevitable failure only makes us the more ridiculous, the higher
the position we seem to have attained.'
Very true; but we should never arrive at the height of wisdom, which
consists in knowing our own ignorance and weakness, unless we made
full trial of our powers. The fall of which you speak should give us a

modesty not to be otherwise obtained, and make us very careful how
we ridicule others, seeing how open to it we ourselves are. Every man
may build his tower of Babel, and if he make a right use of his failure,
may in the end be nearer heaven than if he had never made the attempt.
Ridicule is no argument, and should only be used by way of a jeu
d'esprit, and never on solemn subjects. It is very hard, I know, for one
who has mirthfulness strongly developed, to restrain himself on all
occasions; and what is solemn to one may not be so to another; hence
we should be very charitable to all; alike to the bigots, the dreamers,
and the laughers; to the builders of theoretic Babel-towers, and the
grovellers on the low earth.
'There is one kind of transcendentalism,' replied my friend, 'which you
have not noticed particularly, which consists in believing in nothing
except the spiritual existence of the unbeliever himself, and hardly that.
It believes not in the external world at all.'
If you are on that ground, I have done. To talk of that, would be
wasting our time on nothing; or 'our eternity,' for with that sect time is
altogether a delusion. It may be true, but the believer, even in the act of
declaring his faith, must practically prove himself persuaded of the
falsity of his doctrine.
'You wanted a short name for transcendentalism; if a long one will
make this modification of it more odious, let us call it
Incomprehensibilityosityivityalityationmentnessism.'
My friend said this with a face nearly as long as the word, made a low
bow, and departed. I took my pen and reduced our conversation to
writing. I hope by this time the reader has a very lucid answer to give to
the question, What is Transcendentalism? It will be a miracle if he can
see one inch farther into the fog-bank than before. I should like to take
back the boast made in the beginning of this paper, that I could prove in
five minutes any reasonable man a transcendentalist. My friend
disconcerted my plan of battle, by taking command of the enemy's
forces, instead of allowing me to marshal them on paper to suit myself;
and so a mere friendly joust ensued, instead of the utter demolition of
my adversary, which I had intended.

And this little circumstance has led me to think, what a miserable
business controversialists would make of it, if each had his opponent
looking over his shoulder, pointing out flaws in his arguments,
suggesting untimely truths, and putting every possible impediment in
the path of his logic; and if, moreover, he were obliged to mend every
flaw, prove every such truth a falsehood, and remove every impediment
before he could advance a step. Were such the case, how