Judgments of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand on Proceedings to Review Aspects of the Report of t | Page 3

before the fatal flight the navigation section became aware that there
was some error, although their evidence was that they understood it to
be only a matter of 10 minutes of longitude. In the ground computer the
entry was altered to 166° 58' east, and this entry was among the many
in the flight plan handed over to the crew for that flight for typing into
the computerised device (AINS) on board the aircraft. The change was
not expressly drawn to the attention of the crew. The AINS enables the
pilot to fly automatically on the computer course ('nav' track) at such
times as he wishes.

The crash occurred at 12.50 pm on 28 November 1979. The aircraft
struck the northern slopes of Mount Erebus, only about 1500 feet above
sea level. There were no survivors. The evidence indicates that the
weather was fine but overcast and that the plane had descended below
the cloud base and was flying in clear air. The pilot, Captain Collins,
had not been to the Antarctic before, and of the other four members of
the flight crew only one, a flight engineer, had done so. The plane was
on nav track.
The Chief Inspector of Air Accidents, Mr R. Chippindale, carried out
an investigation and made a report to the Minister, dated 31 May 1980,
under reg. 16 of the Civil Aviation (Accident Investigation)
Regulations 1978. It was approved by the Minister for release as a
public document. The Chief Inspector concluded that 'The probable
cause of the accident was the decision of the captain to continue the
flight at low level toward an area of poor surface and horizon definition
when the crew was not certain of their position and the subsequent
inability to detect the rising terrain which intercepted the aircraft's
flight path'. He adhered to this in evidence before the subsequent Royal
Commission.
The Royal Commission was appointed on 11 June 1980 to inquire into
'the causes and circumstances of the crash', an expression which was
elaborated in terms of reference consisting of paragraphs (a) to (j). Mr.
Justice Mahon was appointed sole Commissioner. In his report,
transmitted to the Governor-General by letter dated 16 April 1981 and
subsequently presented to the House of Representatives by Command
of His Excellency and later printed for public sale, the Commissioner
found that '... the single dominant and effective cause of the disaster
was the mistake made by those airline officials who programmed the
aircraft to fly directly at Mt. Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew'. He
exonerated the crew from any error contributing to the disaster.
The Commissioner and the Chief Inspector were at one in concluding
that the crash has occurred in a whiteout. The Commissioner gave this
vivid reconstruction in the course of para. 40 of his report:
I have already made it clear that the aircraft struck the lower slopes of
Mt. Erebus whilst flying in clear air. The DC10 was at the time flying
under a total cloud cover which extended forward until it met the
mountain-side at an altitude of somewhere between 2000 and 2500 feet.

The position of the sun at the time of impact was directly behind the
aircraft, being in a position approximately to the true north of the
mountain and shining at an inclination of 34°. The co-existence of these
factors produced without doubt the classic 'whiteout' phenomenon
which occurs from time to time in polar regions, or in any terrain
totally covered by snow. Very extensive evidence was received by the
Commission as to the occurrence and the consequences of this weather
phenomenon. So long as the view ahead from the flight deck of an
aircraft flying over snow under a solid overcast does not exhibit any
rock, or tree, or other landmark which can offer a guide as to sloping or
uneven ground, then the snow-covered terrain ahead of the aircraft will
invariably appear to be flat. Slopes and ridges will disappear. The line
of vision from the flight deck towards the horizon (if there is one) will
actually portray a white even expanse which is uniformly level.
What this air crew saw ahead of them as the aircraft levelled out at
3000 feet and then later at 1500 feet was a long vista of flat
snow-covered terrain, extending ahead for miles. Similarly, the roof of
the solid overcast extended forward for miles. In the far distance the
flat white terrain would either have appeared to have reached the
horizon many miles away or, more probably, merged imperceptibly
with the overhead cloud thus producing no horizon at all. What the
crew could see, therefore, was what appeared to be the distant stretch of
flat white ground representing the flat long corridor of McMurdo
Sound. In reality the flat ground ahead proceeded for only